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THE MONTREAL CONFERENCE
AND INTERNATIONAL AVIATION LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
By JOHN E. STEPHENt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE UNITED STATES denunciation of the Warsaw Convention in
late 1965 came abruptly and with little cause. Although the United
States had long objected to the $8,300 Warsaw liability limit as too low,
until shortly before its notice of intention to denounce, it had led its War-
saw partners to believe that the United States did support the doubled
$16,600 limit fixed by the Hague Protocol of 1955, and in fact would
ratify Hague.
A. Withdrawal Symptoms
During 1964, however, the United States agencies first began to use a
$ 50,000 figure as their goal for a new limit. Thus, in September 1964, the
IGIA agencies informally proposed to the United States carriers a volun-
tary side "waiver" of the treaty limit up to $ 50,000.2
The amount of $50,000 was advanced, without further explanation or
justification, as "an adequate amount." However, despite later claims of
"extensive study," it is clear that the $50,000 figure did not rest on any
economic analysis, but was purely arbitrary. The Department of State's
witness in the later Senate Hague Hearings so acknowledged,
The figure of $50,000 is, of course, arbitrary%-as any such figure must be.
But it does represent a substantial amount of money and if an arbitrary
figure is to be chosen, it certainly seems far more in keeping with the
economic realities in the United States than $8,300 or $16,600.'
It was in connection with this $50,000 proposal (to apply to United
States air carriers only) that United States withdrawal from Warsaw (i.e.,
"denunciation") was first threatened. Within less than a year, the threat
to denounce had become the prime United States weapon in a worldwide
campaign to force an increase in the liability limit to $100,000.
B. Inflation By Diplomacy
When the United States promoted the Hague Conference of 1955, its
objective was to raise Warsaw limits to $25,000. The great majority of
tGeneral Counsel, Air Transport Association of America. LL.B., University of Texas. Adviser
to the United States Delegation to the Montreal Conference on the Warsaw Convention, 1966.
' Stephen, The Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, 1966 INs. L. J. 711, 721.
The cited article contains a full account of the evolution of the U. S. position on Warsaw liability
limits; cf. a later account from the viewpoint of the U. S. government agencies, Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REV. 497 (1967).
aTestimony of Leonard Meeker, (then) Legal Adviser-Designate, Dep't of St. Hearings on the
Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965) (hereafter cited as 1965 Senate Hague Hearings).
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States strongly denounced the United States goal as unreasonably high for
most of the world. Nevertheless, as a compromise, Hague conferees finally
agreed to double Warsaw limits to $16,600, and to award on top of that
amount the expenses of litigation. The United States government viewed
this result as the equivalent of its goal of $25,000 (sans award of litigation
expenses) .'
Having essentially attained its $25,000 objective, however, the United
States did not then proceed to ratify the Protocol. On the contrary, before
it had yet consolidated its Hague concessions, it was seeking a $50,000
limit. Before international agreement could be reached on $50,000-as it
was among world carriers approximately a year later--the United States
was proposing a $100,000 limit, which became the leitmotiv for all United
States discussions of Warsaw limits until very recently, when the United
States raised it goal again.
The $100,000 figure was first proposed by the Department of State on
2 August 1965 for "voluntary" acceptance by United States airlines as the
price for the Government's not denouncing the Warsaw Convention.' It
was clearly apparent that the figure was arbitrary. In fact, no economic
justification whatever was given for any such amount. The only rationale
even suggested in the State Department presentation was that a United
States claimant would have to "gross" an award of $100,000, in order to
provide for a "customary" attorney fee of 50 percent,6 and still leave a
'net" award of $50,000.
The $50,000 figure was itself arbitrary, as previously seen.' The pro-
posed doubling of that amount to $100,000 was challenged by the United
States carriers as unsupportable within the awards experience and prevail-
ing indemnification practices in the United States. In a memorandum filed
with the IGIA agencies, the Air Transport Association of America,' on
behalf of the United States airlines, submitted extensive evidence to show
that $100,000 is not supportable as a reasonable award under: (1) recent
United States death and injury awards (which ranged from midpoint ver-
dicts of $13,000 to a high of only $23,000); (2) economic characteris-
a Air Coordinating Committee, ACC 51/22.28 (Revised), as amended, ACC 51/22.28A, 20 June
1957, Exec. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8. The ACC evaluation has recently been challenged by a
former State Department official. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 497. But there can be
no doubt that this was the Government's evaluation, concurred in by the Dep't of St. In the 1965
Hague Hearings, the Administration witness confirmed the official U. S. view that Hague's allow-
ance of expenses of litigation "could in fact be equivalent to more than $25,000." N. E. Halaby,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency, 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 19.
4 Agreement, International Air Transport Association; cf. Stephen, supra note 1, at 726-28.
'For a full account, see Stephen, supra note 1, at 721-25.
6This premise was challenged by the U. S. carriers in a reply memorandum distributed to the
IGIA agencies on 24 Aug. 1965, entitled, "The Proposed Amount of $100,000 As a Waiver of
International Liability Limits Cannot Be Justified." The airlines' memorandum demonstrated that
a 50% attorney-fee is not "customary," and, in any event, should not be given Federal sanction
under the proposed $100,000 interim agreement. It is clear that the U. S. airlines' rejection of the
$100,000 proposal was, in substantial part, because of the stated objective of accommodating a
50% attorney fee. Recent semi-official inferences that the Government's proposal was not actually
premised on an assumed 50% attorney-fee are dispelled by the opposing memorandum filed by the
carriers at the time.
7The $50,000 amount had been proposed in unsuccessful Administration legislation as an auto-
matic accident award to international passengers by U. S. air carriers; cf. 1965 Senate Hague
Hearings.
'The Air Transport Association of America is the national association of the 36 scheduled,
certificated airlines of the United States. It also includes the two principal Canadian carriers as
associate members.
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tics of the United States passengers in international air transportation,
one-half of whom are unemployed or clerical employees (including a large
percentage of students, females, infants, and aged persons) ; (3) existing
indemnity provisions of both government and industry in the field of air
transportation (which establish requirements of only $40,000 to a maxi-
mum of $50,000 per person, including persons on the ground, as ade-
quate) ; (4) Congressional policy in private relief bills for aircraft accident
compensation (which have ranged from only $20,000 to $25,000 per
person); or (5) existing statutory liability limitations of the Federal Gov-
ernment and of fourteen United States states (which range from $10,000
to $50,000, and average only $25,000).' None of this evidence was dis-
puted by the IGIA agencies."
C. Credibility Gap And Whirligig
When the carriers declined the $100,000 proposal, the United States
gave notice of its intent to denounce Warsaw. However, it simultaneously
announced that if the world's airlines would agree within three weeks to a
$75,000 "interim" limit (pending a new treaty limit), the United States
would withhold or withdraw its denunciation. The United States agencies
declared that $75,000 "would afford adequate protection to international
travelers."" It had been only a matter of days since the same United
States agencies had seriously maintained that $100,000 was the minimum
necessary limit to protect international passengers.
The United States "credibility gap" with respect to its liability limit pro-
posals widened immediately and noticeably," and was to take on added
importance in the forthcoming Montreal Conference, as the United States
began to present its "economic case" for a $100,000 limit.
II. THE MONTREAL CONFERENCE
Under the threat of United States denunciation of Warsaw, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization convened an urgent conference of ICAO
States in Montreal to explore possible higher treaty limits." A concurrent
An abstract of the airlines' presentation is found in Stephen, supra note 1, at 722-24.
"°On the contrary, it seems to have been acknowledged that the $100,000 figure was arrived
at in substantial disregard of such evidence, on the premise that such "mathematical" factors should
not be allowed "to limit the recoveries of the survivors of husbands and fathers." For this reason,
a U. S. official has acknowledged, the evidence had "little or no effect on the final outcome."
Mendelsohn, Another View of the Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, 1967 INs.
L. J., 197, 200.
" Dep't of St. Mem,, 19 Oct. 1965. Similar memoranda were handed to foreign civil air
attaches in Washington and mailed directly to foreign governments. While there are certain
discrepancies between the two memoranda, both indicated that the "interim" $75,000 limit might
be expected to prevail as long as eight years.
sa Doubts of the bona fides of the U. S. proposal were also created by the unrealistic three-week
deadline. With slow communications, language barriers, and necessary coordination between carriers
and governments, it was manifestly impossible to meet the 15 Nov. 1965 deadline. Many govern-
ments were convinced that the U. S. did not really intend the proposed interim arrangement to be
affected at that time. This belief seemed confirmed when the U. S. later added new conditions to
the proposed $75,000 interim limit, e.g., absolute liability.
The ICAO "Special Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol" was held in Montreal, Canada, from 1-15 Feb. 1966. Like the Hague Confer-
ence of 1955, it was essentially convened for the accommodation of the U. S. interest in higher
Warsaw limits, and this was recognized by all participants, including the United States. The full
Report of the Special Meeting has been published in two volumes, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 and




ICAO Council resolution implored States , in the interim, not to take
action (such as denunciation) "which might prejudice the successful out-
come of the meeting." The resolution was plainly aimed at the United
States.
But the United States spurned the ICAO entreaties, and on IS Novem-
ber 1965 filed its notice of denunciation, to take effect (under Article
39) on 15 May 1966. Because of the arbitrary and precipitate character
of the United States denunciation, there was widespread conviction among
foreign governments that the action was a tactical ploy to put pressure
on the Montreal Conference to accept the United States proposed $100,000
limit.
If this was the United States strategy for Montreal, it must be con-
cluded that it failed, at least insofar as achieving acceptance by the Con-
ference of the United States proposal of a new $100,000 international
liability limit.
A. The Montreal Agreement
The Montreal Conference rejected the United States proposal for a
$100,000 limit. But to prevent the United States denunciation from tak-
ing effect, the world's air carriers accepted the United States $75,000
interim proposal." The Montreal Agreement has now been in effect for
more than a year, and there is no sign of urgency on the part of the
United States to see it replaced by a treaty amendment."' In fact, there is
substantial suspicion among foreign governments and carriers that it is the
United States strategy to let the carrier side-agreement continue for a con-
siderable term, so that the higher accident awards which will surely result
under a $75,000 absolute liability scheme will acclimate foreign interests
to the rarefied atmosphere of a near-$100,000 limit.
B. Moving Target
Having approached this close to their $100,000 goal16 so easily, however,
the United States agencies have now raised their sights again. In June of
this year the United States notified ICAO that, while it would prefer an
even "higher limit," it would consider a proposal of $108,000.'7
And so it appears that, while our 'Warsaw partners are still catching
their breath at the United States demand for a $100,000 limit, the price
has been raised another $8,000. To many foreign governments, this latest
14 By then altered by the U. S. to require in addition waiver of carrier defenses, viz., "absolute
liability," supra note 12.
"Reference is to the private agreement of 13 May 1966, between 11 United States and 17
foreign air carriers, pursuant to the U. S. Dep't of St. "Proposal for Interim Agreement Among
Carriers," 14 Mar. 1966. The CAB approved the agreement by CAB Docket No. 17325, CAB
Order No. E-23680, 13 May 1966. A CAB press release of 9 June 1966 referred to the agreement
as The Warsaw Convention Liability Agreement. The International Air Transport Association
(IATA), which was active in coordinating international carrier negotiations leading to the arrange-
ment, has called it The Montreal Agreement; cf. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, §
12A.01 (1963), who calls it the Montreal Concord and Lowenfeld, The Warsaw Convention and
the Washington Compromise, 70 J. Royal Aero. Soc'y 1061, who calls it The Washington Com-
promise. The latter term is more descriptive of the political realities of the agreement than the
popular Montreal Agreement.
" Actually, the Montreal Agreement's $75,000 with absolute liability has consistently been re-
garded by the U. S. as the equivalent of $100,000 with only presumed liability. In this sense, the
U. S. has already achieved its goal-in the framework of a private agreement.
1" Letter from Nelson B. David, U. S. Representative to ICAO, to B. T. Twigt, ICAO Secretary
General 5 June 1967.
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United States action merely confirms their long-felt suspicion that it
would have settled nothing to have accepted the United States demand for
$100,000-the amount would simply have been raised again by the
United States, just as it did after attaining its Hague demands.
In little more than two years, then, the United States proposed limit
has been escalated from $16,600 to $50,000 to $75,000 to $100,000, to
the present $108,000. How did the United States agencies arrive at these
amounts? Are they reasonable and necessary to provide an adequate award
to claimants? Can they be justified as a world standard?
It is useful to an appraisal of the United States proposed limits to ex-
amine the arguments which have been advanced by the United States
agencies in their support, particularly against the backdrop of the Mon-
treal Conference.
C. Rationale By Metaphor
Looking back on the period preceding the Montreal Conference, it is
evident that the United States proposed $100,000 limit was devoid of any
rational basis. In a recent post-mortem, a United States official has offered
this purported justification for the United States proposal:
[T]he $100,000 limit did not appear to be at all out of line with the over-
all needs and circumstances of the American public traveling on international
journeys in the 1960's."
What those "over-all needs and circumstances" might be has never
been explained. The statement is reminiscent of the justification given
by the Government's witness for its earlier proposed $50,000 automatic-
liability proposal-viz., that "it may be arbitrary, but it is substantial."' "
After-the-fact rationalization of the $100,000 figure has also been at-
tempted in terms of hypothetical cases involving imaginary decedents and
damages. Thus, the former United States Chairman at Montreal has tried
retroactively to rationalize a $100,000 limit, by putting the case of a hy-
pothetical United States wage earner:
But whatever the method, it was clear that a 35-year-old man earning, say
$10,000 per year and with a wife and minor children could well be "worth"
(in the phrase of the personal injury bar) at least $75,000_$100,000.2°
Apart from the obvious fallacy of claiming validity for a limit based
on hypothetical situations, this mixing of fact and metaphor created mis-
understanding and lack of confidence in the United States position. For
example, a $100,000 limit was defended at Montreal by putting the
hypothetical case of an American male, aged 40, "with earnings of $10,-
000 a year," and an assumed 20-years of remaining useful activity, as
being "worth" $200,000. The example was not only unpersuasive to the
nations present, but was misunderstood as being a factual presentation of
concrete United States data. Thus, in the ensuing debates, not only were
doubts voiced as to the accuracy of these United States "statistics," but
one nation actually argued against the United States case in the belief that
18 Mendelsohn, supra note 10, p. 199.
19 Supra note 2.
"°Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 1061.
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the United States spokesman was claiming the "figure of $10,000 as
being the average salary" in the United States."
D. A Matter Of Intuition
If these attempted hypothetical justifications of the $100,000 limit
have been difficult to accept, the alternate rationalization which has been
put forward by the official United States commentators is no less than
confounding.
In another post-mortem attempt to rationalize a $100,000 limit, a
United States official has deprecated the importance of objective economic
data to support the necessity or reasonableness of the figure as an adequate
award. Admitting that the United States agencies' "statistical data" to
justify the amount were developed only after the fact, the official ac-
knowledged with frankness,
Thus, the statistics served only to confirm the instincts and attitudes of
the decision makers that a $100,000 limit was by no means unreasonable
[Emphasis added.].2
The widespread suspicion among carriers and governments that the
$100,000 figure had been cut from whole cloth by "the decision-makers"
and then sought to be justified retroactively is thus apparently confirmed.
What is not explained is how the "instincts and attitudes" of the United
States decision makers were judged to have greater validity than the
combined contrary instincts and attitudes of virtually every other nation.
Nor has it been explained how the United States decision makers could
make such an immutable decision long prior to even hearing the presen-
tations of the sixty other nations at the Montreal Conference, which was
called for the very purpose of open discussion among nations to decide
these questions.
III. THE UNITED STATES ACCIDENT DATA STUDIES
It appears at least to have been recognized that the United States could
not secure acceptance of a $100,000 limit at the Montreal Conference
on the basis of hypothetical illustrations and intuitive attitudes. On 10
November 1965, the Civil Aeronautics Board accordingly began a statis-
tical survey and study of passenger recoveries (including both judge-
ments and settlements) for serious injury and death in air transport acci-
dents involving United States air carriers, in both Warsaw and non-
Warsaw cases.23 Studies were also undertaken of the trend in settlements
and judgements generally in the United States, resulting from accidents
of all kinds, and of the availability and cost of air trip and passenger and
public liability insurance. These studies were filed with ICAO in January
1966, shortly before the convening of the Montreal Conference.
The CAB studies were very revealing. First, contrary to the inference
long sought to be left by the United States agencies that the average
United States death award (in a non-Warsaw situation) would be in the
2' 1 Montreal Proceedings 47.
22 Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 201.
2Of course, studies in justification of a $100,000 limit came after the fact. The $100,000
figure was first proposed on 2 Aug. 1965, supra note 5. It was reiterated in the U. S. notice of
intention to denounce on 19 Oct. 1965, before the CAB's studies were even begun, supra note 11.
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neighborhood of $50,000, the average-award actually turned out to be
only $38,000.24 ICAO has estimated that, for the world as a whole (in-
cluding the United States), the average non-Warsaw case death settle-
ment (i.e., award or settlement) is about $15,000. Thus, the United
States average award is approximately two and one-half times the world
average.
On this basis, to determine a fair limit to meet United States standards,
it would appear reasonable to apply a "correction factor" of two and
one-halfr to the widely-accepted Hague limit of $16,600, yielding a
figure of about $40,000 as an adequate award by American standards."
This would be a true reflection of the actual differences in United States
and world awards, absent the artificial limitation imposed by the Con-
vention.
If there were added to this $40,000, the approximately $8,000 calcu-
lated by the United States as the equivalent-value of the legal expenses
allowed by Hague, the total would be $48,000-very close to the $50,000
which was the highest limit accepted by a majority of the States partici-
pating in the Montreal Conference. However, the government's working
group apparently eschewed any such analysis, because it did not fit with
the predetermined United States objective of a $100,000 limit.
The nominal level of the average United States recovery disclosed by
the CAB study nevertheless has been acknowledged by members of the
government's working group. Referring to the results as tabulated in
United States Table 1, it has been conceded: "On the other hand, the av-
erage recovery was by no means as astronomical as some had feared."2
As expressed, the observation is anomalous. The carriers had never be-
lieved that the average recovery would prove to be high, and had said so.
Any envisioned "astronomical" average recovery would have had to be on
the part of the United States agencies. But it would hardly seem that the
agencies would have "feared" that outcome. On the contrary, an extra-
ordinarily high average recovery was virtually essential to prove reason-
ableness of their proposed $100,000 limit.
The CAB study was revealing in another way. In 1961, the CAB had
performed a similar study for the period 1950 through 1960." The earlier
study had shown an average non-Warsaw recovery of $26,000. Compar-
ing this with the $53,000 average for 1958-1964, it is seen that the in-
24 CAB Statistical Survey of Death and Personal Injury Awards in Air Transport Accidents In-
volving United States Air Carriers, Table 1, 2 Montreal Proceedings 123.
" This value is very close to the two and one-third increase factor proposed to be applied to
the existing maritime liability limits for death and injury, under S. 2314; cf. Address by Thurman,
Federal Bar Association Seminar, Water Transportation Committee, John Marshall Law School,
28 Apr. 1967.
'Significantly, $40,000 is the approximate mid-range of the $33,200 (two times Hague) to
$50,000 (three times Hague) amounts accepted by most nations at the Montreal Conference.
Whether or not based on the above kind of analysis, these nations' "instinctive" position is borne
out by actual economic data on awards.
2
"Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 553, referring to Table 1 of the CAB Study, 2
Montreal Proceedings 126.
2A fact apparently unfamiliar to some. For example, in 1962 one commentator remarked, "A
thorough study of the range of recoveries in aviation accident cases covered by the Warsaw Con-
vention, as well as in those not so covered, might be enlightening, but no such study appears to
have been made." Lissitzyn, "The Warsaw Convention Today," Proceedings of the American So-
ciety of International Law 116 (1962). The 1961 CAB Study is reproduced in the record of the
1965 Senate Hague Hearings 28-37.
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crease in the level of recovery was $27,000, or 104 percent. Applying the
104 percent increase-factor to the $16,600 Hague limit which the United
States had supported, would yield a figure of $34,000 as a realistic limit.
Even adding to this amount the $8,000 equivalent-value of Hague-allowed
litigation expenses would give a total of $42,000, which is the approxi-
mate amount accepted by most states at the Montreal Conference. But this
analysis was likewise overlooked or disregarded by the United States
working group.
The fact appears to be that the United States agencies did not develop
the various United States liability limit proposals from either study. If
the 1961 CAB study was the basis for the proposed $50,000 automatic
liability in the Senate Hague Hearings in May 1965, then it had to be
the basis as well for the proposed $100,000 limit in August 1965-less
than three months later-because no new studies were made in the in-
terim. How two such diverse limit proposals could have been based on the
same statistical study has never been explained. It is fairly apparent that
neither proposal was based on the 1961 study. Clearly the $100,000 pro-
posal was not based on the 1966 CAB Study, since that study was not
even begun until after the $100,000 proposal had been made.
A. Deficiencies Of The United States Accident Award Studies
In all events, the economic and statistical validity of the government's
studies was suspect. It was brought out in the Senate Hearings on the
Hague Protocol, for example, that the Government's study of award ex-
perience purported to show the economic impact of Warsaw (and Hague)
accidents. But when the Government's witness was questioned on the
scope of the data on which the conclusions of the study were based, it
was admitted that accidents occurring on "purely domestic flights" were
included.
Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, commented,
To be significant, or have any meaning, it seems to me that it would have
to be the same class of cases to make a comparison .... It doesn't seem to be
very meaningful to compare those cases which would not be covered either
by the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol.29
To the surprise of the Committee, as well as participants, the Govern-
ment's witness acknowledged, "That is right."'
The significance of this exchange is that, after admitting the lack of
meaning in the comparative data, the Government proceeded to repeat the
identical process in its 1966 Study for the Montreal Conference, making
the same invalid comparisons. The 1966 Study was nevertheless forwarded
to ICAO and the participating Montreal Conference nations without
correction or change, thus perpetuating and compounding the errors of
the 1961 Study.
The fallacious base for the United States accident data was quickly
noted at Montreal, and exception was taken to including accident awards
from purely United States domestic operations, with the observation that,
29 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 24, 25.
30 Id.
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United States domestic experience had very little resemblance to interna-
tional traffic to and from the United States.5
These clearly fallacious assumptions and methods in the United States
accident-award study did little to earn the United States a sympathetic
hearing by the Montreal Conference participants.
The study was limited to awards data for only the thirteen United
States scheduled international and domestic trunkline carriers. This ar-
bitrarily excluded relevant award data for foreign air carriers operating
to and from the United States and for local service and other nontrunk-
line United States carriers which carry passengers in international air
transportation."5 Such data would not only have been relevant to the
scope of the study, but would have been material to the results, since it
appears that the average recoveries against foreign and United States
nontrunkline carriers would be lower than those against United States
trunklines.
B. Errors And Distortions In The United States Exhibits
Apart from the questionable validity of data and methods in the
United States accident-recovery study, the United States exhibits setting
forth the results of the study contain basic errors, distortions and omis-
sions. This is particularly true of United States "Table 3," which was the
key element in the United States "economic case" at Montreal.
Table 3 purports to show the number of actual awards" for death at
various money levels from zero to $200,000 plus. Purportedly, Table 3
was derived from the preceding Table 2, which shows an annual break-
down of non-Warsaw death recoveries for the some years and for the
same monetary levels."
But Tables 2 and 3 do not agree. The number of "claims involved" at
the settlement-levels $8,292, $16,583, $33,000, and $50,000 in Table 3
do not correspond to the totals for those levels reflected by Table 2:
Table 2" Table 3
8,293-$16,583 ... (566) Over $ 8,292 576
16,584- 33,000... (407) Over 16,583 417
33,001- 50,000 ... (292) Over 33,000 302
50,001- 75,000 ... (238) Over 50,000 248
One or the other of these tables is in error. Since the grand total of
claims at each settlement-level in Table 2 is based on the yearly figures
tabulated therein for each such level, Table 2 is apparently correct, and
" I Montreal Proceedings 47, 48.
" Inclusion of U. S. nontrunkline carriers would have been particularly appropriate in light of
the standard anti-Warsaw complaint that the treaty discriminates against through-ticketed inter-
national passengers on the domestic U. S. leg of their flight.
"2 Montreal Proceedings 126. See Table 3, following, "Percent of Non-Warsaw Death Judg-
ments and Settlements Which Exceed Various Monetary Levels."
' Viz., judgments and settlements. The second column of Table 3 is titled, "Number of Claims
Involved," but it is apparent that the term "claims" must mean awards, since Table 3 does not
reflect the 256 "claims pending" shown in preceding Table 2.
' See Table 2 following: "Levels of Passenger Recoveries," 2 Montreal Proceedings 124-25;
cf. 1 Montreal Proceedings 31.
' The non-Warsaw death totals in Table 2 are not cumulative, as in Table 3, and must be
added together for such a running total, as shown in parentheses. (Also, since Table 3 inverts the
order, and reads from $200,000 to zero, top to bottom, the cumulative totaling in Table 2 must be
performed in the same order.)
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it is Table 3 which is in error. The "percentage" column of Table 3
would, of course, be correspondingly in error, apparently by more than a
full percentage point in each instance.
Errors aside, the critical defects of Table 3 are in its concept and con-
struction. First, it is incomplete in the data displayed. Table 2 shows com-
plete figures for the seven-year period, 1958 through 1964, inclusive, for
fatalities and serious injuries. But Table 3, while purporting to be based
upon Table 2, does not include the data for non-Warsaw serious injuries.
The omission is crucial and grossly misleading. By leaving out the figures
for recoveries for non-Warsaw serious injuries, United States Table 3 com-pletely distorts the actual results of non-Warsaw judgments and settle-
ments in the United States.
On its face, it is clear that the great bulk of recoveries for non-Warsaw
serious injuries has been at the lower "settlement-levels." In fact, the over-
whelming majority of recoveries for non-Warsaw serious injuries would
be covered by the Hague limit. The data in Table 2(2) for non-Warsaw
serious injury recoveries show that more than 86 percent of all awards
have been for less than $16,600."' Stated conversely, only 14 percent of
non-Warsaw serious injury awards have been for amounts higher than
$16,600. But United States Table 3 would make it appear that nearly
50 percent of all non-Warsaw recoveries are in excess of $16,600. This
would be true only if no notice were taken of injury awards.
At the higher settlement-levels, the distortion is even greater. Thus, the
data in Table 2(2) for non-Warsaw serious injury awards over $100,000
show that only 2 percent of such awards are in that range. But United
States Table 3 would make it appear that 18 percent of all non-Warsaw
awards-nearly one out of five-are over $100,000.
In this instance, the distortion resulting from disregarding injury
awards amounts to nearly 20 percent. This is hardly inconsequential when,
as will be seen, the main United States defense of a $100,000 limit has
been based on the percentage of United States claimants at that level who
would receive a normal nonlimited award.
The percentage of claimants thus selected by the United States agencies
as the acceptable minimum was approximately 80 percent." Under United
States Table 3 as constructed-viz., omitting injury awards-the settle-
ment-level at which 80 percent of claimants would receive a nonlimited
award would be $100,000. The $100,000 figure as a proposed limit was
ostensibly selected from Table 3 on that basis." However, as seen, United
States Table 3 distorts these levels and percentages by omitting injury
awards. If injury awards are included in United States Table 3, as they
should be, the result would be to alter significantly the claims-percentages
to which the various settlement-levels correspond. Thus, the settlement-
level at which approximately 80 percent of claimants would receive a full
nonlimited award would become $75,000 rather than $100,000.
This is illustrated by the following comparison of official United States
37 Cf. U. S. Table 2(2), 2 Montreal Proceedings 125.
as I Montreal Proceedings 31, 39. Precisely, it was the reciprocal of the 17.9% figure for claims
over $100,000, as shown in U. S. Table 3, or approximately 82%.
as 1 Montreal Proceedings 31. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 200.
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Table 3, which omits injury awards, and a "Corrected Table 3" which
includes the non-Warsaw serious injury recoveries:
UNITED STATES TABLE 34 "CORRECTED TABLE 3"
Percent of Non-Warsaw Death Percent of Non-Warsaw Deaths and
Judgments and Settlements Which Injury Judgments and Settlements
Exceed Various Monetary Levels Which Exceed Various Monetary
Levels
No. of No. of
Settlement Claims Settlement Claims
Level Involved % Level Involved %
Over $200,000 36 4.4 Over $200,000 38 3.7
Over 100,000 146 17.9 Over 100,000 151 14.7
Over 75,000 191 23.5 Over 75,000 199 19.4
Over 50,000 *248 *30.5 Over 50,000 251 24.4
Over 33,000 *302 *37.1 Over 33,000 309 30.0
Over 16,583 *417 '51.3 Over 16,583 438 42.5
Over 8,292 *576 *70.8 Over 8,292 622 60.4
$1 to 8,292 760 93.5 $1 to 8,292 973 94.5
Zero 813 100.0 Zero 1,030 100.0
Looking at the "Corrected Table," it is seen that the level at which 80
percent of claimants would receive nonlimited recovery (i.e., above which
20 percent would not) is actually $75,000, not $100,000, as indicated
by the incomplete and erroneous United States Table 3.
The true magnitude and significance of these defects becomes impressive
when one recognizes the extent to which the United States case at Mon-
treal was rested on its statistical study of recoveries. Throughout the
United States arguments for a $100,000 limit, stress was repeatedly laid
on the "compelling evidence" of the United States statistical surveys and
tables. In fact, it was stated by the United States spokesman that the
reason $100,000 was not "excessive" was that United States Table 3 dem-
onstrated that this was the level at which approximately 80 percent of
claimants would receive a nonlimited award, this being an acceptable and
reasonable percentage."
The United States reliance on its accident-recovery studies as the basis
for its $100,000 "target figure" has been affirmed by the Chairman and
another member of the United States delegation, subsequently reporting
on the Montreal Conference:
And a limit of 100,000 dollars per passenger seemed to the United States to
make sense, both in economic terms and in terms of adequate protection.
At that figure, according to the statistics, 82 percent of American claimants
would have received the compensation that they would get without a limit...
[Emphasis added.], citations omitted.4'
Describing how the United States case was presented at Montreal, the
same officials state,
"o The values designated by asterisks are apparently erroneous, as previously discussed. Correct
values would appear to be:




4' Specifically, 19.4% in the "Corrected Table 3."
421 Montreal Proceedings 31.
4'Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 564.
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This example plus the careful elaboration on statistics of recoveries and
settlements in the non-Warsaw aviation cases in the United States demon-
strated that the target figure put forward by the United States was by no
means unrealistic [Emphasis added.]."
One of these officials, in fact, has since stated that the ultimate factor
in the process by which the United States fixed upon the $100,000 limit
Ctwas the persuasive element of statistical data," citing United States Table
3 for its showing that at $100,000 only 18 percent of claimants would be
prejudiced in a full recovery of their damages.'
It can hardly be contended, as some have suggested, that non-Warsaw
injury recoveries can be disregarded merely because there are a greater
number of death awards.46 Serious injury judgments and settlements make
up 21 percent of the total non-Warsaw accident recoveries and are equal
to 27 percent of the number of non-Warsaw death recoveries. "
It says enough as to the importance of these data, that their omission
from the Government's key statistical chart resulted in an incorrect figure
of $100,000 as a proposed limit, rather than $75,000. The correct level
being $75,000 on the basis of complete recoveries data, the United States
agencies thus made a 33 3 percent error at the outset, through disregard
of essential and existing serious injury data.
Added to this critical shortcoming of Table 3 is another, viz., the fail-
ure to have included recoveries for the full period 1950 through 1964,
consistently with basic United States Table 1." Table 1, which is the under-
lying statistical display for the entire study, shows total death and total
injury settlements for each year of the 15-year period, 1950 through 1964.
But, inexplicably, Table 3 is limited to recovery data for only the 7-year
period of 1958 through 1964. 9
Quite apart, therefore, from the omission from Table 3 of serious injury
data, it appears beyond question that if Table 3 had included complete
death recoveries data,"0 the result would have been to show a greater num-
ber of claims in the lower settlement-levels."' This is because the level of
death recoveries for the period 1950-1958 is significantly lower than for
"4Id. at 566. The original citation to n. 235 reads as follows: 235. See Tables 554-56 supra.
See also 2 Montreal Proceedings 123-26.
4'Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 200.
" This is especially true with respect to the U. S. agencies, which have strenuously maintained
that injury cases, if anything, are of more concern to the limitation issue-at least potentially-
than death cases. Their position in this respect is reflected by the survey questionnaire's having
placed at least equal emphasis on data as to serious injury recoveries.
47 Cf. U. S. Table 2, 2 Montreal Proceedings 124-25.
4s Cf. Table 1, following, "Passenger Recoveries (Including Both Judgments and Settlements)
in Warsaw and Non-Warsaw Cases, U. S. Carriers," 2 Montreal Proceedings 123.
"gTable 3 was derived from Table 2 (cf. I Montreal Proceedings 31). Thus, it is the basic
data of Table 2 which was limited to the 7-year period, 1958 through 1964. The three-year overlap
of the 1961 and the 1966 studies (i.e., 1958-1960, inclusive) was apparently intended to allow, in
the 1966 survey, for resolution of claims shown as "claims pending" in the 1961 study. Thus the
1966 Table 1 figures for 1958-1959-1960 are not the same as those in Table I of the 1961 study;
cf. 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 35.
"o It does not explain this deficiency of Table 3 merely to observe that the 1950-1958 figures in
Table I were drawn from the earlier 1961 CAB study, which had made no breakdown into "settle-
ment-levels" (e.g., $1 - 8,292; $8,293 - 16,583, etc.), as in the 1966 study. The CAB in its 1965
questionnaire could have, and should have, called for that breakdown of the 1950-1958 figures.
Otherwise, the two studies are not parallel. No significant difficulty would have attached to pro-
curing such a breakdown of the earlier figures, since the 1965 questionnaire resrveyed three of
the earlier years, in any event (viz., 1958-1959-1960). See note 49, supra.
" C/. Table 1 of the 1966 study, 2 Montreal Proceedings 123, and Table 1 of the 1961 study,
1965 Senate Hague Hearings 35.
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the period 1958-1964, as the United States agencies have pointed out. Had
the figures for all years been included in Table 3, the settlement-level at
which an optimum 80 percent of claims would receive the desired non-
limited recovery would doubtlessly have been at an even lower level than
the $75,000 figure developed in the preceding discussion.
That there was awareness by the United States spokesmen of these de-
fects of the studies is apparent from later unofficial alteration of the tables.
In a recent article by the former United States Chairman and one of the
Members of the United States Delegation appear statistical tables pur-
portedly "condensed from the full tables presented to the Conference, ap-
pearing in 2 Montreal Proceedings 123-26."'" An examination of the au-
thors' tables in the article discloses that they are not merely "condensed"
versions of the United States tables, but are reworked tables which attempt
to correct at least some of the errors of the official tables. Nowhere in the
article, however, is this disclosed.
A comparison of the actual United States Table 3 with the authors'
version confirms this conclusion:
Official United States Table Authors' Version
Table 3 "Table II"
No. of Amount of Number Percent
Settlement Claims Payments of Claims of Claims
Level Involved % 0 53 6.5
Over $200,000 36 4.4 $1-$8,292 194 23.9
Over $100,000 146 17.9 8,293-16,683 159 19.5
Over $ 75,000 191 23.5 16,584-33,000 115 14.1
Over $ 50,000 248 30.5 33,001-50,000 54 6.6
Over $ 33,000 302 37.1 50,001-75,000 47 5.8
Over $ 16,583 417 51.3 75,001-100,000 45 5.6
Over $ 8,292 576 70.8 100,001-200,000 110 13.5
$1 to $ 8,292 760 93.5 200,001 and up 36 4.4
Zero 813 100% Totals 813 100.0
Plainly, the authors' "Table II" is not "condensed from" the official
table. It is a different table. Why was the table reconstructed in this way?
A principal purpose appears to have been to correct the errors of compu-
tation in United States Table 3 heretofore discussed." For if the claims
at each settlement-level in the authors' "Table II" are reconverted to the
original format of official United States Table 3, it is evident that the
altered table does affect a correction of those errors.
Such "condensation" as was made of the official United States tables
consisted of leaving out United States Table 2 in its entirety and com-
pletley omitting from Table 1 all data as to non-Warsaw serious-injury
recoveries. This attempted retroactive harmonizing of the format of the
tables so as to show only death recoveries in all tables is an ill-concealed
effort to hide the incompatibility of Table 3 with underlying Tables 1
and 2. But it fails to cure the critical faling of the key table in having
disregarded injury recoveries in the first place.
The United States case at Montreal for a $100,000 limit was based in
substantial degree on its alleged "careful elaboration on statistics of re-
" Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 553 (emphasis supplied).
aSupra, notes 36, 40.
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coveries and settlements in non-Warsaw aviation cases in the United
States. ' ' "O The United States Chairman has stated,
What did make an impression on the Conference was the presentation by
the United States of the American theory of compensation for accident dam-
age, of statistics showing the United States experience with aviation accident
claims not covered by the Warsaw Convention, and of estimates of incre-
mental insurance costs to cover various limits of liability."
The Chairman added that, while the American presentation was not ac-
cepted in toto, "following the American presentation it could no longer be
said that the United States had pulled figures out of the air." Viewing the
reaction of other Conferees, it must be said that this evaluation is highly
optimistic. In fact, it contrasts sharply with the official Report by the
same authors, which described the Montreal Conferees' reaction to the
United States analysis as "almost totally negative."5
The later description more accurately states the foreign reaction to the
United States presentation. There was open mistrust of the United States
statistical data, expressed on several occasions." Indeed, in the ultimate
test of credibility, the failure of the United States studies and arguments
to persuade either industry or the Montreal Conferees of th reasonableness
of a $100,000 limit, was all but complete. Other than its own vote, the
United States proposal of a $100,000 limit received only a single support-
ing vote at Montreal."s
C. Blind Bargain And Hull-Gull
Added to the open mistrust of the United States statistical data pre-
sented at Montreal, was the feeling among many of the Conferees that the
United States was playing a numbers game. Unfortunately this reaction
in substantial part was attributable to the ambiguities and evasions of the
United States presentation.
A singular example was the persistent refusal of the United States
spokesmen to state whether the United States proposals of a $100,000
permanent limit and a $75,000 interim limit included expenses of litiga-
tion (e.g., attorney fees). This was a simple question, permitting of a
direct answer. An intelligent evaluation of the United States proposals
could not be made without it. But it proved all but impossible to get an
answer from the United States spokesman at Montreal, at least until long
after positions of other states had become obviously frozen.
The United States refusal to be explicit on the issue of attorney fees
was more than mere uncertainty, and in fact began even before the Con-
ference. When the United States first released its terms for the United
"Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 566.
55 Id. In still another account, one of the collaborators has similarly assessed the U. S. statistical
presentation as "persuasive." Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 200. However, the reactions of both
carriers and governments suggest that the U. S. statistical presentation was persuasive only to the
U. S. agencies.
"Report of the United States Delegation to the Special International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion Meeting on the Limits of Liability for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol 12, 15 July 1966 (hereafter cited as 'U. S. Delegation Report).
:7 See, e.g., 1 Montreal Proceedings 46; Id. at 9; Id. at 28.
s' U. S. Delegation Report, Attachment D-3. The lone supporter was the Philippines. The U. S.
Chairman has suggested that Sweden also supported the U. S. presentation. Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn, supra note 1, at 565. If so, it was lip service only. Sweden did not register its vote in support
of the U. S. position. U. S. Delegation Report, Attachment D-3.
1967]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
States withdrawal of its denunciation of Warsaw,"' the notice was silent
as to whether the proposed $75,000 interim limit was meant to include
attorney fees. The omission was significant, and appeared to be more than
mere oversight, since the earlier $100,000 interim-proposal had expressly
been stated to include attorney fees.
The carriers naturally at once inquired whether the $75,000 proposal
also included attorney fees. But the Department of State would not say.
In fact, the State Department spokesman expressly declined to answer,
saying that the Government "preferred to remain flexible" on the matter.
The question was never answered."0
At the Montreal Conference, the United States was aware that its bare
$100,000 proposal could not be evaluated by foreign governments until
fully elucidated in a formal United States presentation. The United States
was also aware that, consistently with Hague Article 22 and the United
States position at the Hague Conference (i.e., that attorney fees should be
additive to the amount of any award), the Montreal Conferees would as-
sume that the United States $100,000 proposal was similarly intended to
have attorney fees added (thus making the actual gross amount of the
proposal on the order of $130,000 to $150,000).6'
Despite this foreknowledge, and the fact that the United States was the
proponent (for whom the Conference had actually been called), the
United States put off presenting its concrete proposal for a $100,000 limit
until the Fifth Meeting of the Conference." Even then, the United States
proposals were not offered until after the President of ICAO had called for
it on the record, 8 and other delegations had expressed annoyance that the
United States had promised specific and concrete proposals but had avoided
anything but general statements."
Not until the United States made its concrete proposal was it made clear
that the $100,000 proposal was deemed to be inclusive of attorney fees,
and not, as widely supposed, a figure to which attorney fees of from $30,-
000 to $50,000 were to be added." The United States Chariman has since
acknowledged that this came to the "surprise of a number of the dele-
gates.'"
Why, when the United States agencies fully realized that foreign gov-
ernments would be thus misled by the $100,000 proposal, did they allow
this widespread misunderstanding to continue? Clearly it was not because
" Viz., an interim carrier arrangement of $75,000 per passenger and reasonable prospect of a
$100,000 treaty limit. Dep't of St. Mem., 19 Oct. 1965, supra note 11.
"'The answer was crucial to a carrier decision on the proposal. For if the $75,000 figure did
not include attorney fees, the proposal was actually no different from the $100,000 proposal (in-
cluding attorney fees) already rejected by the carriers. The Government's refusal to answer made
it impossible for the carriers to arrive at a decision to accept. cf. Stephen, supra note 1, at 727.
"1 Article 22, paragraph 4, of The Hague Protocol, providing for the adding on of expenses of
litigation (including attorney fees) where permitted by local law, was adopted as an accommoda-
tion to the U. S. That the other Montreal Conferees had assumed that its effect would make the
U.S. $100,000 proposal actually amount to $130,000, was evinced by the Swedish statement of
3 Feb. 1966, acknowledged by the United States. 1 Montreal Proceedings 32.
"5 The U.S. spokesman had promised to present a concrete proposal on the opening of the second
day's session. 1 Montreal Proceedings 11.
"8 Cf. I Montreal Proceedings 11.
4 Cf. statement of Belgium, 1 Montreal Proceedings 11; statement of the Netherlands, Id. at
29. 6251 Montreal Proceedings 30. The U.S. Proposal, "LIM-13," did indicate that attorney fees
were included, 2 Montreal Proceedings 184 .
06 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 568.
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the question of attorney fees was untimely or unimportant. On the con-
trary, as the United States Chairman has stated, the issue of attorney fees
was "immediately and continuously relevant."7 The only explanation sug-
gested for the maneuver is that the United States delegation-by leaving
the question dangling, and then finally including attorney fees in its fig-
ure-would be thought by the press and foreign delegations to be making
a concession, thereby perhaps influencing more favorable consideration of
the United States proposal." While this may have been the impression re-
ceived by the press, any assessment that this was the reaction of the Mon-
treal Conferees seems badly misplaced.
In all events, although finally having spoken up as to its position on
attorney fees under the $100,000 treaty proposal, it was only a short time
until the United States was again refusing to declare its position on the
attorney fees issue as applied to its $75,000 interim carrier proposal." This
time the United States never did elucidate." The question arose when the
United States was asked whether, in light of its preceding explanation, the
proposed $75,000 interim carrier proposal was also deemed to be inclusive
of attorney fees. The United States spokesman declined to answer, stating
that the question was "premature."'" In the same vein, the United States
representative also declined to state whether the $75,000 United States
interim proposal was to apply universally to all international Warsaw-
Hague traffic, or solely to that originating or terminating in the United
States.72
When it is realized that a great many, if not most, of the foreign car-
riers involved are nationally owned or operated instrumentalities, and that
their flag countries would have a great deal to do with any decision of
such carriers to enter into the United States proposed $75,000 interim
agreement, it is not surprising that many of the Conferees thought they
were being toyed with by the United States.
IV. THE CASE OF THE OPTIMUM CLAIMANT
Apart from the failure of the United States statistical presentation, the
underlying theory of the $100,000 proposed limitation was untenable. The
stated basis for $100,000 to compensate American claimants was that this
was the level at which approximately 80 percent of claimants would re-
ceive the same award as with no limitations.72
Of course, this premise was not self-sufficient. The obvious question was:
why should the limitation be established so as to satisfy 80 percent of
claimants? Why not 50 percent, or 75 percent? In answer, the United
States spokesman explained that the proposed $100,000 limit was not
keyed to "average compensation," but rather:
By "limit" the United States meant a figure that would permit most people,
6 7 1d. at 567.
6" U. S. Delegation Report, 13.
6 As contained in the 19 October 1965 U. S. notice of intent to denounce Warsaw, supra note
53, and Dep't of St. Press Rel. No. 268, 15 November 1965.
" At least during the remainder of the Conference.
71 1 Montreal Proceedings 35.72 id. at 36.
" This conclusion was based on U. S. Table 3. As previously shown, Table 3 is erroneous, and
so is the conclusion. Even accepting the U. S. argument, the correct figure would be $75,000,
supra note 41.
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in most countries to establish, in accordance with whatever legal system
applied in the country where they resided with their families, a monetary
value for the loss they shad suffered as the result of injuries. The United
States hoped that this limit would be realistic and clearly above average
[Emphasis added.]."'
This statement of purpose raised more questions than it answered. First,
"most people" literally would mean something over half, or as few as 51
percent. Second, a figure actually based on "injuries" would have resulted
as previously seen, in a figure of $75,000, rather than the United States
figure of $100,000 (based solely on death recoveries). Thus, either the
United States figure of $100,000 was wrong, or the statement of United
States intention was inaccurate.
In any event, it was made clear that the United States was pressing for
a figure substantially above average compensation. In this, the United
States proposal represented a departure from the principles of international
aviation liability limitation to which the United States itself had thereto-
fore subscribed, since both Warsaw and Hague contemplated average re-
coveries.
Two justifications were advanced for this change in United States pol-
icy. First, it was stated that setting a limit based on assuring a nonlimited
recovery to at least 80 percent of American claimants would "permit the
variation in recoveries that is called for by a system of just compensa-
tion."7' No one was clear as to exactly what was meant by this curious
statement. If it was intended to say that "just compensation" demands full
recovery, the statement was anomalous as applied to a discussion of limit-
ing liability. Yet, there is some reason to think that something of the kind
was intended. For example, the United States Chairman in later referring
to the United States analysis, stated:
These figures seemed to show clearly that any limit of liability would
have an inhibiting effect on a substantial portion of American victims."'
Naturally, a liability limit-by definition-has an "inhibiting effect"
on full recovery. On the other hand, if the emphasis of the quoted state-
ment was meant to be on the number of claimants who would be so lim-
ited, it is equally enigmatic, since that number is very small, indeed, as
will be seen.
Thus, it appeared from the United States recoveries study itself that the
average level of recoveries in non-Warsaw (death) situations is approxi-
mately the same as Hague limits, viz., about $16,600. ' The number of
claims which would receive nonlimited recoveries at that average level
is, of course, roughly one-half of the total number of 813 claims, or 407..
An equal number of claims would experience varying degrees of limita-
741 Montreal Proceedings 31; 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
75 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
" Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 553.
77 Cf. U. S. Table 3. This result confirms the aptness of the choice of limit in Hague. It also
tends to discredit the U. S. thesis at Montreal that, "Only when the limit has been very low, as
under Warsaw, has the limit tended to be the average-in fact generally the automatic-sum at
which claims are settled." 2 Montreal Proceedings 177. The U. S. recoveries study itself discredits
the U.S. statement: e.g., over 98% of Warsaw injury recoveries were in excess of the Warsaw limit
(Table 2(2)). Even in Warsaw death cases, nearly 25% of recoveries were in excess of the War-
saw limit (Table 2(1)).
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tion.8 As the proposed $100,000 settlement level, 667 of the total 813
claims (i.e., approximately 80 percent, would receive nonlimited recoveries
and 146 would be limited in some degree.
But these totals are for a seven-year period, 1958 through 1964, inclu-
sive. In any one year, only approximately one-seventh of such claims
would fall within the stated levels. In short, under the United States pro-
posed 80 percent optimum limit, 95 United States claims each year would
receive nonlimited recovery, as compared to 58 United States claims under
the average level of settlement. This means that only 37 more United
States claimants a year would be benefited by setting the limitation at
$100,000 than by setting it at the $16,600 Hague level.
The supposed benefits of a $100,000 limit become even more inappre-
ciable in comparison to a $50,000 limit, such as was embraced by most of
the nations at Montreal. Under the $50,000 recovery-level as a limit, 82
American claimants each year would receive nonlimited recoveries"' in
comparison with 95 such claims at the proposed $100,000 level. In other
words, only 13 more United States claimants each year would be benefited
by setting the limit at the $100,000 level than at the $50,000 level.
It was astounding to the nations at Montreal that the United States
should be attempting to force a $100,000 limit on the rest of the world
for the special benefit of only 13 American claims a year by claimants in
the upper income brackets.
Apart from the obvious disparity of the proposal in comparison to other
nations' experience, it could not even be reconciled with the purported
needs of other United States claimants. Thus, while ensuring a difference
in the outcome of the accident claims of only 13 more United States claim-
ants a year, the $100,000 proposal would leave 21 high-income United
States claimants a year subject to a limitation."s Under the strict logic of
the United States argument, moreover, these 21 claims would actually ex-
perience a greater "disadvantage" proportionately than deprived claimants
at the lower recovery levels, since they would include the claims which
range far above the limit.81
Confronted by this apparent illogic, the United States rationalized,
In the view of the United States, persons who could expect recoveries in
excess of $100,000 need not be provided for with respect to such excess in
a convention. They can be asked to make other provisions for their families,
such as by life insurance or the like, but such a requirement should not, in
the United States view, be placed on members of the travelling public whose
anticipated recoveries are in the relatively common range of $50,000-$100,-
000.1
2
The statement is anomalous. It says that it is unacceptable to require
" But there would still be a "variation of recoveries," just as in the case of a limit established
at the higher optimum level of $100,000. No difference is perceptible in this respect, using the
Government's same rationale.
" Viz., 575 out of the total 813 claims for the 7-year period, or 82 per year; cf. Table 3.
80Viz., 146 of the total 813 claims which are over $100,000, or 21 each year; cf. Table 3.
" Recent U.S. aviation accident awards have ranged above $1 million; cf. Ikado v. Northwest,
No. 61 C 1671 (N.D. 11. 1962) in which the pre-judgment settlement was $1 million; and
Hollerich v. Boeing, No. 63 C 20360, Cir. Ct., Cook County (1.11. 1963), in which th jury re-
urned a verdict of $2 million which was ultimately settled for something over $1,200,000; cf.
Kennelly, Litigation of an Air Crash Case Against Manufacturer and Airline Which Resulted in
Verdict for Two Million Dollars for Single Death, 9 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 5 (1965).
"a 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
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those in the $50,000 to $100,000 recovery brackets to protect themselves
by insurance, because this is a "relatively common range" of recoveries.
The inference is that recoveries over $100,000 are not a "relatively com-
mon range." But neither statement is correct. Relatively, recoveries in the
range over $100,000 are more common than in the $50,000 to $100,000
range. According to the United States recoveries study, Table 3, there are
21 recoveries yearly above $100,000, but only 13 in the $50,000 to $100,-
000 range. The United States statement can hardly be rested, therefore, on
the incidence of recoveries shown in its own study. Similarly, the United
States replied that "persons who relied on an indemnification in excess of
$100,000 would protect themselves by taking out trip insurance for that
additional amount [Emphasis added.]."'"
But this sweeping statement was not supported by any economic evi-
dence as to the actual incidence of trip insurance coverage in the various
income or recovery brackets. For all that appears, as many travellers rely-
ing on "indemnification in excess of" $50,000 take out trip insurance as
do those above $100,000. In fact, neither of these generalizations was ever
supported by either evidence or argument.
At the same time, little difference is seen, in principle, between looking
to the limited number of high-income persons with potential $50,000 to
$100,000 claims to provide for their extraordinary personal requirements
by individual insurance, as opposed to such persons in the bracket $100,000
and above. Particularly is this the case when considering that the experi-
ence of virtually no other nation in the world supports such an extra-
ordinarily high limit.
Plainly, the first of the United States' arguments for fixing limits at an
optimum level of potential recovery, rather than the average, was not sup-
ported by the facts. On the contrary, a limit of liability established at the
average of United States recoveries clearly would not have an "inhibiting
effect" on a "substantial" number of United States claimants. The number
would be extremely small.
The second United States argument for an optimum recovery level
was that such an increase in limits would not "have great effect on the
average recovery."84 Again, the United States produced no evidence to
support its contention, but asked the Montreal Conferees to accept its as-
surances "on faith.""
Other nations declined to accept this United States representation on
faith, and replied that in their own experience the establishment of higher
limits did tend to increase the average of awards." Even the United States
spokesman conceded that, in the case of an increased limit, with absolute
liability, there would tend to be greater average compensation up to the
limit than without the limitation, particularly in the case of out of court
settlements, as opposed to litigated awards.8 7
In all events, the United States rationale for an optimum standard rather
than one based on average claims and recoveries was admittedly based on
8 1 Montreal Proceedings 35.
84 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
85 1 Montreal Proceedings 43.
8 Cf. Intervention of Italy, 1 Montreal Proceedings 46; New Zealand, Id. at 23; Argentina,
Brazil and Colombia, 2 Montreal Proceedings 195.
7 I Montreal Proceedings 90; cf. confirmation of that conclusion as to increased average awards
under the Montreal Agreement. Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 1061.
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United States data, experience and objectives. This hardly conformed to
the underlying theory of Warsaw-Hague as an international agreement,"
nor to the premise of the Montreal Conference as defined by President
Binaghi of the International Civil Aviation Organization in his opening
address:
As to the amount, it should be established by considering the average in-
come of the average air traveler that flies internationally. He is a person
with an income which is not low, but which is not very high either. It
would not be possible to legislate for the high-income individual [Emphasis
added.],8"
The true significance of the United States arguments was not lost on the
Montreal Conferees. The United Kingdom quickly pointed out that--even
if the United States premise were accepted, that an optimum limit should
be adopted, and even if the optimum percentage of claimants to be ac-
commodated was agreed to be 80 percent-this would not yield a world-
wide figure of $100,000 as an optimum limit, but something considerably
less. The reason, of course, was that $100,000 as the amount required to
accommodate an optimum 80 percent of claims would be the figure only in
the case of United States recovery data.90
For example, such an optimum for the United Kingdom would be satis-
fied by a limit of only $25,000 to $30,000."' In fact, as noted by the dis-
tinguished Delegate of Jamaica, Sir Neville Ashenheim, no country but
the United States claims any such limit as $100,000 as necessary to satisfy
such an optimum number of claims."2 Jamaica accordingly proposed that
the United States, being unique in this respect, assume national responsi-
bility for its very few high-income passengers who require special protec-
tion, and individually indemnify them. No one was surprised when the
United States representative demurred to this proposal."3
Thus did it become evident at Montreal that what the United States was
really demanding was a worldwide liability limit to assure recovery of full
damages by 80 percent of claimants, based on United States recovery ex-
perience. And that this limit was to govern the claims of the nationals of
all countries, regardless of the actual awards experience of those countries.
This was the thrust of the United States proposal as revealed in the United
States opening statement at Montreal:
We would expect a realistic limit of liability not to be near the average
recovery for the world, or indeed, near the average recovery in the United
States. We would expect the limit, rather, to be well above the average. 4
One difficulty with this theory, as foreign nations were quick to point
88 Cf. the fixing of Hague Protocol limits on the basis of the average settlement for death and
injury claims. G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to The Hague Conference
of 1955, Exec. H., supra note 3, at 28.
8I Montreal Proceedings 2.
88For the reasons previously discussed, it would not even be the figure resulting from U.S.
recovery data, if complete and correct data had been used.
9 1 Montreal Proceedings 40; cf. Canada, at $35,000, Id. at 58. For some, e.g., Norway, the
maximum aviation award did not exceed $30,000. Id. at 21.
92 1 Montreal Proceedings 41; cf. concurrences of France, Id. at 34; Czechoslovakia, Id. at 35;
Niger, Id. at 48.
"aActually, the U.S. promised "to study" the proposal. 1 Montreal Proceedings 32. But there
is no evidence that it ever did.
" 2 Montreal Proceedings 177.
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out, was that even the United States average recovery, which was shown
by the United States studies to be $38,000, is not only well above the
world average recovery of $15,000, but would exceed the world optimum
recovery.95
This topsy-turvy situation caused foreign governments to make diplo-
matic protests to the United States even in advance of the Montreal Con-
ference. The United States Opening Statement acknowledged that the
communications it had received from foreign governments had "said that
the United States is seeking to impose its standards of living upon all the
countries of the world.""
At Montreal this foreign protest was restated and given added empha-
sis. The unilateral and provincial nature of the United States proposal and
rationale shocked and affronted other nations. Despite United States at-
tempts to minimize the economic impact of its proposal on other nations,
virtually "every delegate at the Meeting" 7 joined in the protest against
the resultant inequities.
V. DISRUPTIVE PAROCHIALISM
"Who sits in a well sees little of the sky."
Mexican proverb.
In the public hearings by the United States agencies on the issues of
United States policy on Warsaw, the proposal of United States denuncia-
tion was termed "an act of disruptive parochialism."98 The phrase proved
an apt one, and came to characterize the foreign reaction to the United
States position.
In the opening statement of the United States at Montreal, after having
acknowledged the need for international cooperation in a world legal
regime of aviation accident liability, the United States Chairman said,
The principal concern of my government now is to safeguard and protect
our citizens ... [Emphasis added.]."
In the discussions and public exchanges on the issue of Warsaw limits,
the reiterated emphasis of the United States statements has been in terms
of the interests and requirements of "American travelers," the "United
States courts," and "the United States traveling public."'" Throughout
the Montreal Conference, and the subsequent exchanges which culminated
in the Montreal Agreement, the repeated rationale of the United States
position was "the high standard of living" of United States citizens. It was
even asserted that the abrupt action of the United States in summarily
denouncing Warsaw rather than invoking the conciliatory and consultative
procedures of Article 41 of the Convention was because of United States
"impatience......
Not surprisingly, other countries reacted vigorously to the notion that
95 Supra note 91.
"2 Montreal Proceedings 177.
' 1 Montreal Proceedings 42.
" Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 534.
'02 Montreal Proceedings 174.
19° See, e.g., Dep't of St. Press Rel. No. 110, 13 May 1966, announcing withdrawal of the U.S.
denunciation of Warsaw; cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 1061, referring to "American travelers,"
"American survivors" and "the American view."
191 1 Montreal Proceedings 141.
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United States travelers are somehow more valuable than their own na-
tionals. Many nations did not even yield in debate as to relative "high
standard of living." Canada, for example, pointed out that it too, is a
North American country with a "high standard of living." Nevertheless,
Canada has found no justification for a liability level of $100,000 as a
means of providing adequate protection for Canadian air travelers.
On the contrary, as stated by the Canadian delegate,
The Canadian experience showed that the figure of $35,000 as an upward
limit of liability would go well beyond all but a very few of the claims
which had been settled in the past six years."'
The Canadian statement was a direct repudiation of the United States
contention that:
In the United States, and it is believed in a number of other countries, a
low limit has the effect of depriving a substantial percentage of accident
victims (or their survivors) of the compensation to which they would
otherwise be entitled.' 5
The countries referred to were later specifically identified as Canada
and Australia."4 But Australia joined with Canada in repudiating the
United States inference that, because of a comparatively high standard of
living, it would support the United States position. The Australian Dele-
gation expressly rejected the proposed $100,000 limit as unnecessary and
undesirable."' 2
On a purely statistical comparison of recoveries, by countries, it is true
that American claimants at least appear to be worth more than other na-
tionals. The question is, however, what do such statistics really show?
Perhaps they demonstrate only that United States juries give higher awards
than foreign courts."'
Data as to American awards are understandably viewed balefully by
other nationals.0 7 Even those countries with living standards the equal
of our own may be forgiven their skepticism of the interpretations which
the United States has sought to place on such award comparisons. " ' Well
might they flinch at comparative tabulations of recoveries, such as the
Montreal exhibit which showed that one American nose "banged on a
table" actually received a higher money award than fatal injuries suffered
by a British national. 0 '
The Minutes of the Montreal Conference manifest the vexation of other
nations at the suggestion that aviation liability limits for the rest of the
world be fixed on the basis of claimed United States statistical justifica-
tions. Nor do our ICAO partners as a matter of philosophy concede, as
asserted by the Administration witness in the Senate Hearings on the
10' Montreal Proceedings 18.
10 2 Montreal Proceedings 184.
104 Montreal Proceedings 35.
'O'l Montreal Proceedings 25.
10 Or that many foreign nations have domestic statutory liability limitations which keep their
awards moderate. Fifty-four nations have domestic limitations which are as low or lower than
Hague limits and thirty-five as low or lower than Warsaw. 1965 Senate Hague Hearings, 15-16.
1o See, e.g., the intervention of Kenya, 1 Montreal Proceedings 46.
1os Cf. the United Kingdom statement that a level of "one-third or one-fourth of that proposed
by the United States" (viz., $25,000 to $30,000) would provide adequate protection for British
claimants in U. K. experience. I Montreal Proceedings 39.
... 2 Montreal Proceedings 121.
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Hague Protocol, that the radical increase in international limits proposed
by the United States is justified, "Because in our culture we value the
human life greater than in some others.""0
VI. OF PEASANTS AND KINGS
To bring such special liability advantages to a mere handful of high-
income United States passengers,' a $100,000 limit would require vir-
tually every other nation and the bulk of international passengers to pay
for the resultant increased liability-insurance costs.
Australia cautioned that,
It was essential to avoid raising the limits of liability to such a figure that
a great majority of the air travelers would be paying for a very small
minority of high income-earning travelers, most of whom, in any event,
would have made adequate provisions in the case of their death or injury
in an aircraft accident. The proposed United States figure of $100,000
would bring about this undesirable situation."'
Added to this objection was the protest that the burden of such in-
creased costs would fall the heaviest on those countries, airlines, and in-
ternational passengers who would benefit the least-or not at all-from in-
creased limits. A joint presentation by the governments of Argentina,
Brazil and Colombia stated that the air transport users of the world would
be paying for liability coverage from which they would "derive no bene-
fit .... Other nations concurred."4
The keynote objection to this concept was stated by the Delegation
from Nigeria, which-while expressing willingness to compromise-coun-
selled:
But such a compromise solution should be one in which the peasant is not
made to pay for the comfort of the king [Emphasis added.]."'
Even the United States Chairman has acknowledged that the "peasant
versus king" theme thereafter dominated the Conference, and with good
humor, has conceded: "It was difficult to answer questions of this kind
.... .11 The fact is that the question was never answered. The United
States representative attempted to rebut the argument by saying,
In the first place, the peasant would not have to pay the costs, since in-
surance rates were on the whole based on experience, and the carriers who
110 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 15.
'" Viz., only 13 more than at $50,000, and only 37 more than at $16,600, supra notes 78 & 79.
The latter figure squares with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) studies showing
approximately 35 American fatalities (out of the worldwide total of 90 each year involving in-
comes in excess of $is,000), which might require compensation above $50,000. I Montreal Pro-
ceedings 19-20; cf. the Canadian assertion that only "approximately eight" U. S. passengers per
year would thus benefit from a $100,000 limit, I Montreal Proceedings 42. It is not apparent how
the Canadian figure was arrived at.
112 1 Montreal Proceedings 26.
113 2 Montreal Proceedings 195.
114 Cf. Greece, I Montreal Proceedings 46; United Kingdom, I Id. at 10; Mali, I Id. at 21;
Jamaica, I Id. at 40; Congo (Brazzaville), 1 Id. at 40; Canada, 1 Id. at 42; Niger, I Id. at 48;
cf. U.S.S.R., I Id. at 14.
"' I Montreal Proceedings 9.
"' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 565.
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carried only peasants would not have increased risks as a result of the higherlimit."'
The fallacy of the United States reply is obvious. First, it erroneously
assumes that some airlines carry only "peasants." But no airline carries
only passengers in the low-income bracket."' In nearly every accident
there are at least some large claims.
The argument equally erroneously assumes that "peasants" fly princi-
pally international carriers of the less-developed nations and that "kings"
fly only the large airlines of the wealthier nations. These are highly dub-
ious assumptions. The fact is that approximately as many American pas-
sengers fly on foreign airlines in international air transportation as on
United States-flag carriers."' Moreover, not even the upper-bracket United
States passengers, who are the cause for concern, fly on just the bigger and
wealthier foreign carriers. For example, the most-celebrated United States




Contrariwise, a large number of low-income foreign nationals fly on
United States-flag airlines. Thus, it was pointed out at Montreal that the
United States-flag airlines carry significant numbers of seasonal migratory
workers from the Caribbean and Latin American area to the United
States.'
The principal fallacy of the United States reply is in the assumption that
the underwriting of liability insurance, and fixing of premiums, rests on
an analysis of the composition of passenger traffic by flights. Any such
notion is unreal. While traffic makeup may receive broad and general con-
sideration in planning liability insurance coverage, it is a serious overstate-
ment to suggest that liability insurance premiums are fixed with any such
micro-precision. Moreover, liability insurance premiums for even United
States-flag carriers are established on the basis of "world-passenger fatality
experience, rather than on United States carrier experience."' 2
In all events, the United States Chairman acknowledged with candor
that the United States response to the "peasants versus kings" attack on the
United States proposal "never really got across. " "
VII. THE FIFTY-CENT MYTH
In every forum, including Montreal, the United States position has been
that increasing Warsaw-Hague limits to $100,000124 will not have any
... I Montreal Proceedings 27, 43.
"' If this were so, the ICAO reports on insurance-premium experience under the Montreal
Agreement would be expected to show little or no increase for the smaller carriers and the carriers
of the less-developed countries. But such is not the case. It is understood that some of the largest
premium increases have been experienced by these carriers.
.. Air Transport Association, Air Transport Facts d Figures 41 (1967). The distribution
averages about half and half. In 1966, 51.5% of passenger travel between the U.S. and foreign
countries was on U.S. flag airlines. In 1965, 51% of such travel was on foreign airlines.
" Reference is to the quarter-million dollar claim involving the interests of former Senator
Homer Capehart. See Capehart v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. (AVIANCA) (unre-
ported), Doc. No. 10,315-M-Civil E. C. (1963); cf. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at
535.5 2id. at 565.
12a Civil Aeronautics Board, "Economic Impact Upon the United States Flag Carriers of With-
drawal From the Warsaw Convention," Dec. 1961, note 7, at 10. Reproduced in 1965 Senate Hague
Hearings 34, note 2.
12 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 566.
14 Or to $75,000 with absolute liability as under the interim Montreal Agreement.
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appreciable economic effects. Resulting increases in air carriers' insurance
rates have been painted as minimal. Two favorite United States methods
of stating this proposition most advantageously have been to express the
resulting premium increases as: (a) a percentage of air carriers' gross op-
erating expense (e.g., "on the order of one-half of one percent"), or (b)
assuming that the costs would be passed to the passenger, as a small addi-
tion to a "typical" international air ticket (e.g., "less than a dollar").'~'
At Montreal, the United States estimated a 50 percent increase in in-
surance costs on the North Atlantic, as the result of raising limits to
$100,000. This was said to equal an increase of "roughly" 1 to 12 per-
cent of gross operating expense, or an increase of "roughly" 50-cents per
passenger on a "typical one-way trip between New York and London,"
for which the economy fare was estimated at $250.128
This hypothetical" United States proposition, based on a series of as-
sumptions and suppositions of questionable validity... quickly came to be
known by the Montreal Conferees as "The fifty-cent myth."'' 8
It was noted first that the United States illustrative case was not only
fictitious, but was not even-as described-"typical;" viz., a typical in-
ternational air passage originating in the United States would not be
one-way. But for a round-trip passage, the assumed distributed insurance-
costs would be effectually doubled, making the costs in the hypothetical
case one-dollar rather than "fifty-cents," from the very outset.
Furthermore, as pointed out by the distinguished Observer for the
International Air Transport Association, Dr. Gazdik, the attempted mini-
mizing of actual increased costs by reducing such amounts to a "unit-
charge" per-ticket is not only misleading, but prone to huge errors of cal-
culation."2 ' Under the fifty-cent hypothetical case, an error of calculation
of only two-cents on each ticket would result in an actual cost to inter-
national carriers of one million dollars.
A fundamental misconception of "the fifty-cent myth" was the as-
sumption that the total increase in liability insurance costs from a high
liability limit would fall ratably among the world's airlines. But, as
pointed out by numerous countries at Montreal, this would not be the
case."2 ' Again, it would be the smaller countries and airlines who would
feel the greater impact, and who would bear a disproportionate burden.
The grand sophistry of "the fifty-cent myth," of course, was its con-
cept: viz., that-if added carrier operating costs, when expressed on a per-
ticket basis, constitute an apparently nominal amount-the increased
costs "would not greatly affect the economics of international air trans-
portation.''
Even accepting the United States insurance statistics,2 ' which postulate
125 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 14; 1 Montreal Proceedings 31; 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
126 Id.
12 The observer for the International Union of Aviation Insurers seriously questioned the un-
derlying assumptions and statistics as contained in document "LIM-5, Statistical Data Concerning
Passenger Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention," reproduced at 2 Montreal Proceedings
21. See 1 Montreal Proceedings 24.
18 1 Montreal Proceedings 14; 2 Montreal Proceedings 186.
'"1 Montreal Proceedings 19.
s' cf. Greece, 1 Montreal Proceedings 46; Kenya, 1 Id. at 47; Australia, 1 Id. at 25; Canada,
1 Id. at 18; Senegal, 1 Id. at 14.
' 2 Montreal Proceedings 185.
122 The U.S. statistics were seriously questioned; cf. 1 Montreal Proceedings 14, 18, 25, 46, 47.
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a rise of only 50 percent in insurance costs from a $100,000 limit,"3' the
total amount of increased insurance cost falling on international air trans-
portation would be twenty-five million dollars." Since insurance costs are
a non revenue-producing item of air carrier operating expense, there is no
off-setting enhancement of operating revenue from the adding of such an
expense. This means that added air carrier costs from such non revenue-
producing items as insurance have a singularly adverse impact on earnings.
ICAO has concluded with respect to the insurance rise from an increased
liability limit:
The main economic effect to the air transport industry would fall on U.S.
international airlines.1 '
Based on United States-flag airlines' carriage of approximately 52 per-
cent of the international traffic to and from the United States,"' the
United States-flag airlines' share of such a $25 million additional insur-
ance cost would approximate $13 million-which is nearly 10 percent of
the total net-profit of the United States international airlines industry."7
Even for the United States-flag carriers, such a result is neither minimal
nor insignificant. For carriers of small nations, many of which are profit-
less or marginal, the impact of such increased insurance costs would dras-
tically affect their national subsidy-financing and developmental fares de-
signed to expand the benefit of air transportation to the public.'
Nowhere has disregard for international air transport effects been more
disdainfully, or more errantly, stated than by the United States claimant-
lawyer group, which under the contingent-fee system stands to profit
most from high limits:
The international air carriers of the U. S. have now matured to a position
of economic stability. In 1964, Pan American and Trans World Airlines
each earned net profits of $37 million. It is, therefore, apparent that the
Warsaw Convention has outlived its usefulness."3
This neat paralogism simply takes no notice of the existence of the
257 foreign air carriers, which carry as many United States passengers in
international air transportation as do the United States-flag carriers."Four times as many international fatalities occur on foreign airlines (and
"Replies of ICAO member states to the 1966 ICAO Insurance Questionnaire estimated their
insurance increases at from 50% to 275%; 2 Montreal Proceedings 73. The U.S. presentation
adopted the lowest estimate. It is understood that actual increased insurance costs from the later
Montreal Agreement exposure range up to 275% for U.S. carriers and up to 800% for foreign
carriers.
13l Montreal Proceedings viii.
3'2 Montreal Proceedings 24.
"30Air Transport Facts &% Figures (1967) supra note 118, at 41.
137 Id. at 35. There would, of course, be a tax offset which would reduce the effect on earnings
to some extent.
aS See intervention of Mexico, 1 Monreal Proceedings 10; Congo (Brazzaville), 1 Id. at 16,
22; Tunisia, 1 Id. at 24; Zambia, 1 Id. at 33, 41; Trinidad-Tobago, 1 Id. at 25; Cameroon, 1
Id. at 26; Mauritania, 1 Id. at 46; Senegal, 1 Id. at 14; Kenya, 1 Id. at 47; Australia, 1 Id. at 25;
Morocco, 2 Montreal Proceedings 210.
".. TRIAL 4 (Oct./Nov. 1965), the organ of the American Society of Trial Lawyers (formerly
the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys).
14 Supra, note 118. Moreover, one of the cited U.S. carriers had no fatal accidents in 1964,
and the other had only one; cf. CAB, "A Statistical Review and Resume of U.S. Air Carrier Acci-
dents, 1964" at 10. In 1966, and 1967 to date, U.S. flag international air carriers have had no
international accidents involving passenger fatalities; cf. Accident Data, National Transportation
Safety Board (1967).
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on international flights not starting or ending in the United States) as on
the United States-flag international airlines.' All or most of these acci-
dents were covered by the Warsaw Convention (or Hague Protocol)."'
But foreign air carriers do not have earnings comparable to the United
States carriers. On the contrary, in the year given, only six foreign air
lines had earnings of as much as $ 5 million." Many more had losses. Of
the 59 foreign airlines of the ICAO states whose financial data is reported
by ICAO, 16 showed either a net loss for the stated year or a net accumu-
lated loss.'44 In other words, more than one of four foreign air carriers
operates at a loss, based even on the most favorable current earnings data.
Even BOAC, the foreign air carrier showing the highest profit for the
cited year, viz., $23 million, must be viewed as actually operating at a his-
torical loss, since its opening previous-year balance of "negative retained
earnings" equalled $253 million, leaving BOAC's 1964 year-end result
at a cumulative loss of $230 million. And while BOAC did have the
highest foreign-carrier earnings in 1964, it had the biggest loss in the
preceding year, 1963 (viz., $31 million).'"
Many of the recent foreign-carrier loss operations have been by the
smaller carriers, 47 e.g., Austrian Airlines, British West Indian Airways,
CAT (Civil Air Transport-Republic of China), LAV (Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana-Venezuela), Ecuatoriana Airlines (Ecuador), Ethiopian
Airlines, El Al Israel, Ghana Airways, United Arab Airlines, Varig Air-
lines (Brazil), Peruana Airlines, Cubana Airlines, TAI (Transports Aer-
iens Intercontinentaux-France), Aer Lingus (Ireland), Kuwait Airways,
Polynesian Airways (New Zealand), and Polish Airlines "LOT." The
smaller carrier losses have not been minor, ranging from nearly $1 million
to over $9 million annually. Many of the named carriers have had fatal
accidents in the past five years."'
But loss operations are not confined to the smaller countries and car-
riers. A majority of the big foreign carriers have operated at a loss in
given recent years, or historically, e.g., BOAC (United Kingdom), Cana-
dian Pacific Air Lines, KLM (the Netherlands), Japan Airlines, Qantas
Empire Airways, Ltd. (Australia), and SAS (Scandinavian Airlines Sys-
tem, Scandinavia)."' In fact, KLM has shown net losses for each of the
ICAO reporting-years since 1961, ranging from $2.4 million in 1964 to
a high of $26 million in 1965. Its cumulative historical loss is $42 mil-
lion."5 Although showing a profit in some of those years, Canadian Pacific
has a cumulative historical loss of $12 million."'
141 ICAO, Statistical Data Concerning Passenger Liability Limits Under the Warsaw Convention
(LIM-5), 1 Feb. 1966, Table 2, data for international flights for the most recent 5-year period,
2 Montreal Proceedings 27; cf. testimony of Najeeb Halaby, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Agency, 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 25.
141 1965 Senate Hague Hearings 25; cf. Reiber, Ratification of The Hague Protocol; Its Rela-
tion to the Uniform International Air Carrier Liability Law Achieved by the Warsaw Convention,
23 J. AIR L. & COM. 279 (1956).
143 ICAO, Digest of Statistics No. 115, Financial Data 35 (1964), covering the 98 carriers of
60 reporting ICAO member states.
144 id.
145 Id.
146Id. at 35 (1963).
14 ICAO, Digest of Statistics, Financial Data, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965.
14 IATA, Accident Data, for scheduled and non-scheduled carrier members.
141 ICAO, supra note 146; infra note- 170.
150 Id.
"I 1d. at 35 (1965).
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Foreign governments and carriers at Montreal had good cause to be
concerned with the economic consequences of a $100,000 limit. Other
nations joined Australia in its refusal to accept the United States argu-
ment that increased costs "would be of little significance.
'15
VIII. INFANCY AND MATURITY
The other notion expressed in the claimant-lawyer comment, viz., that
the international air transport industry has now "matured," and there-
fore no treaty liability limitations are needed, has received considerable
mention5 ' but apparently little serious analysis. In the United States open-
ing statement at Montreal, it was similarly stated that, in contrast to the
Warsaw period, when international air transport "had to be protected
from the risk of catastrophic accidents," there is no longer the same con-
cern "about the serious economic consequences one single air disaster
might have for aviation."....
These statements from the negligence bar were not unexpected. Com-
ing from the United States aeronautical agencies, however, which were
supposedly the most familiar with the onset of revolutionary new air-
craft commitments for the world's airlines, the cliches of "infancy" and
"maturity" were an anti-climax and a disappointment.
In 1967, capital outlays for new flight equipment and related facilities
by United States airlines alone will reach an all time high of more than
$2 billion. In the period 1966-1970 planned new equipment expenditures
will reach over $8 billion, and for the ten year period 1966-1975 will
be more than $18 billion."' This rate of capital expenditure will be nearly
ly 2 2 times the rate of the previous years. "' A very substantial part of
this new investment is represented by early commitments on the Boeing
747 aircraft, on which deliveries are scheduled to begin in 1969."'
The unit of aircraft investment will increase within two years from
the $5 to $7 million investment for the Boeing 727 and 707 jets to more
than $20 million for the Boeing 747 "jumbo jet.".... The additional bil-
lions of dollars to finance SST acquisition and service will then follow
closely during the next five-year period. Apart from SST development,
however, during the next six years the size of the air transport industry
will double. There is growing concern by carriers and governments alike
as to the financial strains which will be placed on the world's airlines dur-
ing the next ten years by new aircraft alone.
Added to these massive capital investment costs confronting the world's
carriers will be anticipated major increases in taxes, landing fees, com-
munications costs, user charges, delay costs, interest rates, and fuel costs,
amounting to nearly $3 billion for the United States carriers alone."'
'521 Montreal Proceedings 25.
153 See Acosta, Wilful Misconduct Under the Warsaw Convention: Recent Trends and De-
Velopulents, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv. 575 (1964); cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 1061.
1 Montreal Proceedings 6.
"s Air Transport Facts e Figures (1967).
15'Air Transport Association, "1967-1971 Financial Projections and Requirements."
'" Air Transport Association, "Delivery Schedule-New Aircraft on Order," 1 Aug. 1967.
138 ATA, supra note 155.
159 Id.
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Even greater are the probable costs to carriers of meeting social problems
such as noise and air pollution' and of industry participation in meas-
ures for the relief of traffic congestion on the ground, at airports and in
the air.
At the same time that these staggering capital and operating costs are
having to be met, the current economic picture for international air trans-
portation is increasingly disturbing, with falling rate of traffic growth,
declining profit margins, reduced investment turnover, lowered rate of
return, and falling stock indexes. The magnitude of this deterioration be-
gan to be apparent at mid-year, and has now become the source of wide
concern by air carriers, investors and governments.'
Aside from the possible higher treaty limits,6 ' what will be the effects
of these great changes in international air transportation on accident rates,
risk of loss, per-accident exposure, insurance "accumulation," and insur-
ance market capacity for liability cover?
First, as a matter of pure statistical probabilities, it is apparent that
there will be a significant increase in the number of accidents and losses.
The 1,525 world airline jet fleet in existence at the beginning of 1967 is
expected to more than double, to approximately 3,500 jets, by 1972.6
True, as the United States pointed out at Montreal, the accident rate is the
lowest in history today; but even at the same rate,'" the risk exposure
will be substantially increased because of the greater number of larger
aircraft operating. Likewise, the per-accident exposure will be increased
by reason of increased passenger seating, e.g., a probable 362 to 490
(economy) seats in the Boeing 747 jumbo jet as compared to approxi-
mately 150 seats in the present Boeing 707.
In 1966, fifteen of the 1,500 world airline jet aircraft became total
losses in accidents, a loss rate of one-percent.6" In 1971-1972, more than
100 of the new jumbo jets will be operating. At a one-percent loss rate,
there could be at least one total loss of a jumbo-aircraft. The estimated
nominal loss on such a fully-loaded aircraft ranges from $70 million 6" to
more than $82 million. 6 7 The maximum loss on a Boeing 747 jumbo jet
with 100 percent load and 360-seat configuration, however, is estimated
at $154 million. "' However, this figure does not allow for life, accident
'6' Possible engine retrofitting for noise abatement by U.S. carriers alone has been estimated at
$3 billion for the existing 1,000 jet aircraft fleet. Jet Aircraft Noise Panel, Office of Science and
Technology, Executive Office of the President, Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports 5
(March 1966).
161ATA, supra note 155, e.g., the fiscal year report as of 31 March 1967, for Qantas (the
Australian national airline) showed a net loss of $1.7 million.
162Excepting, of course, the existing $75,000 absolute liability limit of the Montreal Agree-
ment, which may be assumed to continue as an interim standard until a new treaty limit is de-
veloped. The U. S. position is that this could be as long as eight years (supra note 11).
"'Sykes, Big jets Need Big Insurance, AMER. Av. 93 (June 1967).
164 There is a recognized historical basis for assuming that the accident rate will increase, at
least during the "teething period," or introductory years, of a new aircraft type; cf. Sykes, supra
note 163, at 94; infra, note 167.
165 Sykes, supra note 163, at 93.
"6British Insurance Association (BIA), as reported in Travel Management Newsletter 7 (12
June 1967), estimating $140 million passenger liabilities in a collision between B-747s.
167Sykes, supra note 163, at 94. The estimate is at the rate of $20 million for hull loss and
$62 million for passenger liability alone, disregarding third party claims.
168 Swiss Reinsurance Company and North American Reinsurance Corporation, 3 Expr-RlOCA
5 (1967). The estimate includes hull (without loss of use), passenger liability, freight and baggage
liability, third party liability and crew liability. N. B., the estimate is based on a conservative 360-
seat configuration. However, it is anticipated that jumbo jet passenger capacities will tend to in-
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and property insurance held by passengers, shippers and crew; when these
are added, the estimated loss on a single fully-loaded jumbo jet rises to
$184 million... For a collision of two such aircraft, 7 ' the loss estimate be-
comes $368 million.
On an industry basis, even if accident rates proved to be better than
those of current jets, with an average of 200 jumbo jets over a five-year
period (viz., 1,000 jumbo jet "airplane years"), and a five-year average
load factor of 500 passengers, the "probable loss" predictions are in ex-
cess of $1 billion."'
Furthermore, this increased probable-loss underwriting capacity by the
insurance market must be developed in less than three years. By contrast,
the insurance industry had nearly ten years to develop the $25 million
per aircraft capacity increase to cover the present probable-loss potential
of the current jets. The insurance market capacity per jet aircraft upon
introduction was at a maximum of $2.5 million per aircraft. Figuring a
maximum 105-passenger load, the total probable-loss was nevertheless
underestimated at $5 million per aircraft. This figure shortly increased
to slightly over $10 million per aircraft for the earliest subsonic jets,
climbed steadily to $28 million, and by the end of this year, with
"stretched" DC-8's carrying 250 passengers, will reach $35 million per
aircraft.'
At Montreal, the United States spokesman declared,
The fears of 1929 are certainly over today . . . Thus despite the great
increase in the size of aircraft and the prospective further substantial in-
crease, we can hardly be concerned, as we were 35 years ago, about the serious
economic consequences for the industry of a single air disaster.'
To contend that the loss from a single accident within the next four
years of $154 million to $368 million is of no serious economic conse-
quence or concern is contrary to reason. Such an accident-by no means
unthinkable-would be actuarily, and literally, a catastrophe. In fact, it
would apparently be, with the possible exception of the Texas City disas-
ter, the costliest single man-connected accident in United States history.'
crease to 500 passengers or more, with responsible estimators predicting capacities on the order of
1,000. Fortuna, "Aviation Insurance For Jumbo Jets, Airbuses And SSTs," a paper prepared for
the Connecticut General Flight Forum, 9 December 1966.
169 Id. Even this amount does not include possible liability claims against traffic control or-
ganizations. Many are public organizations, either immune or without private insurance coverage.
170As of 1 August 1967, even with the present 2,000 U. S. airlines aircraft and 104,000 U. S.
general aircraft, the collision rate is increasing. By 1971 it is estimated that there will be 3,500
U. S. airlines aircraft and 136,000 U.S. private aircraft. Since 1 January 1956, there have been 102
mid-air collisions in the U. S., with 669 fatalities. Six of the collisions have involved carrier aircraft.
In eight of the eleven years the number of collisions ranged between 10 and 14. There were 19 in
1960, 20 in 1961, and 27 in 1965. Records, National Transportation Safety Board.
171 Fortuna, supra note 168. Hurricane Betsy of 1965 is regarded as the most costly natural
disaster in U. S. history, with losses of $715 million. Next worst was the San Francisco earthquake
at $225 million. This compares with recent riot damage losses of $38 million in Watts, $15 million
in Newark and estimates of more than $100 million in Detroit; cf. quoted reports of National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, Wall Street journal 22 (28 July 1967). By comparison to
natural disasters, the largest maritime accident loss in history apparently will be the shipwreck of
the tanker Torrey Canyon earlier this year, estimated at $20 million. The second largest maritime
loss is reportedly the collision-sinking of the Italian passenger liner Andrea Doria in 1956, with
an insured loss of $16 million; cf. the Wall Street Journal. Enormous as they are, these maritime
losses are minor in comparison to the loss of a single transport jumbo jet aircraft.172 Fortuna, supra note 168.
a7a 2 Montreal Proceedings 176.
174Cf. House Rep. No. 1305, to accompany S. 1077, reporting over 750 fatalities and 3,500
injuries, with property damage in the millions, from the Texas City explosions.
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The United States agencies acknowledge that the objective of interna-
tional liability limitation is to "prevent the growth of international avia-
tion from being choked off by one or more catastrophic accidents. 175 But
they assert that, "We are over the infant industry stage. Equally impor-
tant, the techniques, equipment, and experience of our current interna-
tional air transportation are such that the hazards of flying have been
very much reduced and are actuarily predictable. 17.
Even in the abstract, there is a certain speciousness in the infant-indus-
try/mature-industry hypothesis. Viewed retrospectively, the international
air transport industry, of course, is not literally the "infant industry" that
it was in 1929. But, in context, the awesome 1967-1975 commitments
and exposures of the world's carriers render them fully as dependent today
on reasonable protection in the long-run public interest.
Whether these staggering liabilities are really "actuarily predictable"
is itself questionable. The loss of even a single Boeing 747 jumbo jet
would equal about half the present total losses on hulls and liabilities for
the scheduled airlines."' A leading aviation insurance authority states that
four or five accidents involving total loss with one type of aircraft,
"would upset completely the insurance market if each accident involved
a payment of from $40 to $60 million."'7 8 From the analysis already stated,
a risk of exposure of this magnitude by 1971 is very real.
At the least, even assuming the availability of a private insurance mar-
ket for such catastrophic exposure, the market could become academic fol-
lowing such a loss. For example, the insured property losses from Hurri-
cane Betsy in 1965 were $715 million.' Although the insurance market
was able to absorb these enormous claims, the market capacity for new
coverage at existing rates disappeared-immediately and completely. Any
renewals or new cover, if available at all, demanded up to a ten-fold
premium increase.
Analyzed from another standpoint, the relatively commonplace expo-
sure of the air transport industry to a jumbo jet probable loss of $70 to
$82 million per aircraft, which has been "actuarily predicted," exceeds the
$60 million single-incident liability limit granted to atomic energy plans
under the Atomic Energy Act.'' In fact, under the noted "no recourse"
subsection of that Act, the aggregate liability from a single nuclear inci-
dent is limited to $560 million, of which $500 million is indemnification
furnished by the United States.
In light of the enormous potential damages from a nuclear accident,"'
the $60 million liability limitation (per nuclear-incident) established by
Congress for private atomic energy operators far surpasses the immunity
benefits which would be afforded by Warsaw-or, for that matter, Hague
.. 2 Montreal Proceedings 176.
1743 Id.
177Sykes, supra note 163, at 94.
178 Id.; ef. Fortuna, supra note 168, which states that the excess insurance now available to
aviation-$60 to $80 million per occurrence-will not be adequate for B-747 jumbo jet operation.
1
7
1Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts 7 (1966).
18042 U.S.C. § 2210 (1964), the so-called "Price-Anderson Act."
... The Brookhaven Report, Atomic Energy Commission "WASH-740," estimated from three
assumed types of accidents a range of personal injury of zero to 3,400 killed and 43,000 injured,
and property damage of one-half million dollars to $7 billion; cf. Collier, "Are the 'No Recourse'
Provisions of the Price-Anderson Act Valid or Unconstitutional?" (Sept. 1965).
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-limits, even as applied to a collision of two fully-loaded Boeing 747
jumbo jets.
The reaction of the Montreal Conferees to attempted United States as-
surances with respect to the world insurance market capacity and to in-
consequential economic effects was summarized by the Delegate from
Senegal,
182
In our view, it is erroneous to reason on a world-wide basis as if the insur-
ance market was institutionalized or as if insurance was taken out by the
States or was guaranteed by them as is done in the case of workmen's com-
pensation. On the contrary, nothing guarantees that the present conditions of
the insurance market will be permanent if tomorrow the limits are established
as too high a figure. No compensation between companies-as is the case
of workmen's compensation between industries-is available to guarantee that
the small or average-size companies will not bear very much more than their
proportion of, and, perhaps, will be unable to bear, the consequences of a
modification of the international regime."'
Recognizing that even a $25 million increase in the operating costs of
international air transportation would raise serious problems of finance
for many smaller carriers, New Zealand pointed out further that there was
no assurance that smaller carriers would be allowed to pass such costs on
to passengers, as mentioned in the United States presentation, since under
the existing international fare machinery, the United States (through
CAB disapproval of the IATA fare involved) could prevent the adoption
of any such increase." The New Zealand Delegate specifically questioned
whether the United States government would request United States-flag
airlines to support such fare increase resolutions in IATA, and whether
the United States would then approve any such IATA increased fares (or
deferment of new lower fares) for that purpose." 5
The United States Chairman affirmed that it would be the policy of the
United States government to urge United States member airlines of
IATA to support fare increases (or the maintenance of a fare that might
otherwise be reduced) commensurate with any increased insurance costs."'
Likewise, he affirmed that the United States authorities would approve
any such resolutions adopted by IATA to increase fares (or defer the in-
troduction of new types of cheap fares) to meet such increased insurance
CoStS.187
It would be interesting to observe whether the Civil Aeronautics Board
would stand by this commitment of the United States if increased IATA
18. 2 Montreal Proceedings 186.
183 An added objection was that such insurance burdens on all carriers transporting any inter-
national passengers would give competitive control to large carriers on "air routes on which com-
petition is practically non-existent;" cf. Pourcelet, Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention by the
United States, LE DisvoIR (Montreal, P. Q.) (1965) (Department of State Translation LS No.
40708).
1841 Montreal Proceedings 42.
18s Id.
181 Montreal Proceedings 43. The Government has not yet so urged the U. S. carriers to seek
JATA fare increases, despite reported increased airlines' insurance costs of from 50% to 275%
under the $75,000 absolute liability limit of the Montreal Agreement, supra note 132.
.. I Montreal Proceedings 42-43. Later comment suggests that the U. S. Chairman has either
reconsidered or forgotten this commitment: viz., he now states that whether costs are passed on to
the passenger by increased fares is a "detail" with which governments need not concern themselves.
Lowenfeld, supra note 15, at 1061.
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fares were filed for approval, based on higher insurance costs from the
interim Montreal Agreement of $75,000-absolute liability.
In any event, the United States argument was that the onus of specially
protecting high-income United States passengers should rest with the air
carriers, and not with such passengers themselves or the United States
government:
In short, it seems to us that whether they absorb the cost, pass it on in-
directly in the fare, or make a special charge, the airlines as a group are the
best locus of responsibility. It is the airlines, therefore, who ought to have
the primary burden of taking out insurance for air accidents.'88
The opposite view was stated by nearly every other nation, holding that
the key issue was whether those few upper-bracket United States passen-
gers needing special protection should pay for it, or whether the cost of
their special protection should be shared by all the world's passengers, in-
cluding the great majority who do not need it. As stated by the Delegate
of Trinidad and Tobago, the individual traveler has "both the freedom
and the responsibility" to select his own required level of insurance, and
there is no need or equity of a system "which would impose a high level
of insurance protection on the passenger regardless of the passenger's needs
or wishes."'.8
As with the peasant versus king issue, this second major issue at Mon-
treal was not met by the United States presentation, unless it can be said
that by its effectual withdrawal from the Meeting on 14 February 1966,'"
the United States forced an eventual "solution" in the form of the "in-
terim" Montreal Agreement among the world's air carriers for a $75,000
absolute liability limit.
IX. QUIDDITIEs AND QUILLETS
"rWhen the lawyers have finished, no rice field remains to
divide among the litigants."
Chinese Proverb
The announcement of United States denunciation of Warsaw was hailed
by the claimant-lawyer group as a "Great Victory" by the American Trial
Lawyers Association. 9'
Now the Administration-after learning from the American Trial Lawyers
Association the realities of the need for even a greater amount-wants an
interim limit of $75,000 and a permanent limit of $100,000....
The American Trial Lawyers were cited by both the New York Times and
the New York Herald Tribune, as well as news associates, as being the
leading exponent for the protection of the international air traveler through
eliminating the Warsaw Convention.
Through its Aviation Section and its Chairman Lee S. Kreindler of New
York, tremendous research and support was furnished U.S. senators and
State Department officials on the public's side of the liability limit question,
pointing out the unfairness of the Convention and the Hague Protocol."'
"8 2 Montreal Proceedings 176.
189 Cf. the intervention of Trinidad-Tobago, I Montreal Proceedings 25.
0 See the consolatory final speech of the U. S. Chairman, 1 Montreal Proceedings 140.




In preparing its case for Montreal, the United States working group
gave consideration to the interests of "the plaintiffs' bar" and made al-
lowance in the proposed $100,000 limit for including attorney fees. ' In
fact, as seen, the proposed $100,000 limit was rested at the very outset on
the rationale of allowing for a 50 percent attorney-fee.'" The United
States working group accepted that contingent fees are the "almost ex-
clusive means" of paying attorneys in United States accident litigation,
generally at a level of one-third of the award or settlement, ranging up to
one-half, and acknowledged that such "lawyers' fees add significantly to
the overall cost of accident settlements."'8 5 Nevertheless, it was concluded
that such fees were "worthwhile," and the United States proposal at Mon-
treal was stated to be inclusive of attorney fees.
Other nations protested strongly. Sweden stated that not only was the
system different elsewhere, but in certain countries "the system used by
the attorneys in the United States was prohibited." In this light, it was
pointed out, to delete Article 22 of the Hague (authorizing the addition
of attorney fees according to local law) as the United States proposed to
do, would now necessitate adopting a prohibition against adding attorney
fees to the award.'"
Sweden pointed out that the United States proposal of a $100,000 limit
to include attorney fees, accompanied by abolishment of Hague Article
22, would, in fact, "ask the majority of other states for 100,000 United
States dollars, while they themselves were prepared to pay only 70,000-
75,000 United States dollars, in accordance with the fees of attorneys in
the United States."
France joined in challenging the validity of the United States "two-
level" proposed liability limits, where the higher level (including attorney
fees) was for the sole accommodation of attorneys, rather than victims. 9'
Spain objected that the international issue of accident compensation was
altogether separate from the strictly domestic issue of legal fees, and that
the two should not be mixed together in a treaty. The Spanish Delegation
also considered the $25,000 which the United States proposal allocated to
attorney fees as "far too large," representing "50 percent of what the
claimant would receive ...and could easily be interpreted as an attempt
by men of the legal profession to ensure a substantial fee to themselves."'"
Finally, asked Spain, what justification is there for fixing a high limit
based on allowing for attorney fees, in those cases where no litigation is
involved?
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia objected that the inclusion of attorney
fees in a proposed high limit,
[O]n the basis of American experience, besides causing many legal prob-
lems in various countries, would require the establishment for the rest of
the world of American standards which are not appropriate for other coun-
'asLowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 561-62; cf. Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 201.
194 Supra, note 6. Although this 50% figure, as well as the concept, was challenged by the U. S.
carriers, it is still being adhered to by the U. S. spokesmen as the prevailing amount "io some cases;"
cf. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 561.
"' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 561-62.
19I Montreal Proceedings 32.
'
9 Id. at 85.
198 Id.
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tries. The limit of liability would be raised again on unreal bases due to the
contingent fees which is (sic) peculiar to American life. . .. "'
For its part, the United States at least purported to have the objective
of reducing litigation,"° and claimed that its proposal at least would not
increase delay and litigation."1 But virtually every other interest repre-
sented at Montreal agreed that the end result of the United States proposal
would be to increase and delay litigation.!"0
This view was affirmed even by the Chairman of the American Society
of Trial Lawyers' Aviation Committee, himself a leading claimants' law-
yer and the author of a recognized treatise on aviation accident law, who
stated with respect to the interim Montreal Agreement,
With the opportunity to recover $75,000 and proceed for more, the new
concord seems likely to inspire additional litigation, in Warsaw Convention
cases, where there may very well not have been litigation before . . .The
$75,000 payments will also serve to finance efforts to prove negligence on
the part of manufacturers, air traffic control facilities, and other third
parties who may be responsible for a given accident."2
X. THE OVERPRICED SPLIT-LEVEL
Having failed at Montreal to persuade other nations of the reasonable-
ness of a proposal based on allowance of attorney fees, the United States
is nevertheless now seeking to raise its $100,000 proposal to $108,000, on
the basis that this is the only way to "net" the claimant $75,000 (as in
the Montreal Agreement) after allowing for attorney fees of $33,000
(viz., one-third of a $100,000 award)." ° As an alternative election, the
United States proposal would sanction a lower level-ridiculed as the
"split level" plan-of $75,000 exclusive of attorney fees. It is clear that
the United States itself would elect the higher level which includes at-
torney fees.
The latest United States proposal assumes: (1) that the Convention it-
self should recognize expenses of litigation, including attorneys' fees, as an
element of damages; (2) that it is acceptable and proper to limit claim-
ants' awards, but not attorneys' fees; (3) that the higher level should be
based on the scale of fees charged by claimants' lawyers in the United
States; and (4) that in most, if not all, cases the amount of such attorney
fees should be at least 30 percent of the award.
These assumptions clearly are not justified. In fact, the United States
proposal of an express "alternative" limit to include attorney fees would
upset the plan of the Convention. The money amount in Hague Article
22 is a limitation on damages. "5' Under the Warsaw-Hague system, this
limitation on damages is expressly stated in money, and it is left to local
law to determine how much, if anything, to award as costs and attorney
'992 Montreal Proceedings 197.
z°01 Montreal Proceedings 90.
201° Id. at 27.
.. See, e.g., International Union of Aviation Underwriters, ICAO Working Paper 9-3, 9 Sep-
tember 1966; International Air Transport Association, I Montreal Proceedings 19; cf. United
Kingdom, I Id. at 9; France, 1 Id. at 93; Congo (Brazzaville), I Id. at 22; Poland, I Id. at 84.
..a 2 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 380 (Cumm. Supp. 1966). Accord: Speiser,
"Can U. S. Airlines Afford the Warsaw Convention Any Longer?" 13 (11 February 1963).
204 Sufra, note 17.
" Article 22 was amended by The Hague Protocol, paragraph 4, to permit the award (under
local law) of legal costs and expenses, in addition to damages.
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fees. The United States proposal would invert the treaty scheme by having
the higher liability limitation be an arbitrary money amount which would
include an assumed 30 percent attorney fee, based on.United States stand-
ards.
From nearly any point of view, the treaty method is preferable. Fixing
the amount of an "alternative" limit on the basis of arbitrarily assumed
attorney fees of 30 percent could operate even against the attorney's in-
terest, in those situations where he might charge more than 30 percent. On
the other hand, where the legal fees actually amounted to less than 30
percent there is no justification for the Convention in effect exacting a
higher amount. In fact, such a provision would tend to raise attorneys'
fees to 30 percent, in those situations where they might otherwise be less.
Worse, by providing an option under which the higher total award
goes to a claimant with legal expenses and court costs, an incentive is
created for the incurring of attorney expenses. Apart from promoting lit-
igation, or needless attorney fees, such a scheme would almost inevitably
precipitate a shift to such all-inclusive awards by those jurisdictions where
attorney fees are less than 30 percent (i.e., to take advantage of the higher
"alternative" limit). Yet no greater recovery would be had by the claim-
ants themselves. The "alternative" award would thus contribute nothing
to the injured party, while disrupting the simplicity and uniformity of
the treaty.
The inference in the United States $108,000 proposal that countries
which do not allow legal expenses as part of the award can be accommo-
dated only by fixing the actual money amount of an all-inclusive award
in the treaty, is not well-founded. Since the purpose would be merely to
sanction an award of attorney fees in addition to damages, this could be
accomplished directly by so stating in the treaty. °6 Even if the United
States does not ratify Hague, any future amendment raising the Warsaw
limit could simply include such language. There is plainly no need for a
"split-level" system. It is far more practical to leave it to local judicial
process to determine how much additional award should be made for legal
expenses and attorney fees.
The treaty should not undertake in any case to say how much attorney
fees should be. Least of all should it attempt to do so on the basis of what
claimant lawyers charge in the United States. However, if the treaty is to
be used effectually to safeguard attorney fees, no ground appears for not
establishing reasonable limits in the treaty on the percentage of the award
to go to lawyers.
It would be particularly appropriate to prescribe reasonable limits on
claimants' attorney fees in Warsaw claims, in light of the treaty's pre-
sumption of defendant liability, which lightens the claimant lawyer's task
and benefits him in this respect equally as it benefits the claimant.
There is nothing novel or unconventional in so limiting attorney fees
where required by the overriding public interest. The percentage of award
for attorney fees is now limited in several United States statutes."0 " Con-
200 This is exactly what Article 22, paragraph 4, of The Hague Protocol provides.
20 See, e.g., the International Claims Settlement Act (which limits attorneys' fees to 10%7)
and the Federal Tort Claims Act (which limits attorneys' fees to 20%). Because of this fee limita-
tion, one negligence-commentator advises "bothered" claimant-attorneys not to handle claims
which involve joinder of the U. S. as a necessary defendant. 2 L. KREINDLER, supra note 203, at
127.
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gress itself, in passing private bills to compensate claimants in aviation
death cases, has not only limited attorney fees to 10 percent, but has pro-
vided that any pre-existing arrangement with a lawyer for a higher per-
centage would be unlawful. It is thus consonant with public policy in the
United States to limit attorney fees in this very context.
XI. AN APPRAISAL
There would appear to be no more likelihood of other nations being
persuaded of the new United States proposal of a $108,000 treaty limit,
than they were at Montreal of a $100,000 limit, particularly where the
principal justification advanced for the additional increase is the implied
treaty assurance of a one-third contingent fee for United States claimant
lawyers.
The reiterated United States preoccupation with the assumed special
needs of a small handful of high-income American passengers and the
United States claimant-lawyers who litigate this class of claims has preju-
diced the attainment of a desirable and rational treaty solution of the
problem of international liability limitations.
From this point, serious effort should be devoted to solving the issue of
international treaty liability limitations in its proper context, as our ICAO
partners have reminded us, viz., not just as a carrier-passenger relation-
ship, but "as a matter of high international value and interest."
APPENDIX
RECOVERIES FOR DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY RESULTING FROM
AIR TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING UNITED STATES AIR CARRIERS
This is a statistical survey prepared by a staff unit of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board relative to the special meeting convened by the Civil Inter-
national Aviation Organization to be held in Montreal on February 1, 1966
to consider the questions of the limits of liability for passengers under the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
The study is based primarily on existing records of the Board and on
responses to two successive questionnaires circulated to air carriers, cover-
ing a fifteen year period from 1950 to 1964, inclusive, involving passenger




PASSENGER RECOVERIES (INCLUDING BOTH JUDGMENTS AND
SETTLEMENTS) IN WARSAW AND NON-WARSAW CASES
U. S. CARRIERS*
Passenger Deaths Serious Injuries
Average Average
Applicable No. oft Total Per Pasgr. No. of Amount of Per Pasgr.













































































































* Includes 13 U.S. carriers operating scheduled international and/or domestic trunkline services,
as follows: American Airlines, Inc., Braniff Airways, Inc., Continental Air Lines, Inc., Delta Air
Lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., Northeast Airlines, Inc., Northwest
Airlines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc., Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., Trans World
Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines, Inc., and Western Air Lines, Inc.
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TABLE 2 (1)
LEVELS OF PASSENGER RECOVERIES
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* Includes 13 U.S. carriers operating scheduled internationad and/or domestic trunkline services,
as follows:
American Eastern Pan American Western
Braniff National Panagra
Continental Northeast Trans World
Delta Northwest United
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PERCENT OF NON-WARSAW DEATH JUDGMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS
WHICH EXCEED VARIOUS MONETARY LEVELS
Number of Claims
Settlement Level Involved %
Over - $200,000 36 4.4
" 100,000 146 17.9
75,000 191 23.5
50,000 248 30.5
If 33,000 302 37.1
16,583 417 51.3
If 8,292 576 70.8
$1 to 8,292 760 93.5
Zero 813 100%
Source: Carrier replies to CAB questionnaire covering years 1958-1964.
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